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ABSTRACT
The power and communication networks are highly interdependent and form a part
of the critical infrastructure of a country. Similarly, dependencies exist within the
networks itself. Owing to cascading failures, interdependent and intradependent net-
works are extremely susceptible to widespread vulnerabilities. In recent times the
research community has shown significant interest in modeling to capture these de-
pendencies. However, many of them are simplistic in nature which limits their ap-
plicability to real world systems. This dissertation presents a Boolean logic based
model termed as Implicative Interdependency Model (IIM) to capture the complex
dependencies and cascading failures resulting from an initial failure of one or more
entities of either network.
Utilizing the IIM, four pertinent problems encompassing vulnerability and pro-
tection of critical infrastructures are formulated and solved. For protection analysis,
the Entity Hardening Problem, Targeted Entity Hardening Problem and Auxiliary
Entity Allocation Problem are formulated. Qualitatively, under a resource budget,
the problems maximize the number of entities protected from failure from an initial
failure of a set of entities. Additionally, the model is also used to come up with a
metric to analyze the Robustness of critical infrastructure systems. The computa-
tional complexity of all these problems is NP-complete. Accordingly, Integer Linear
Program solutions (to obtain the optimal solution) and polynomial time sub-optimal
Heuristic solutions are proposed for these problems. To analyze the efficacy of the
Heuristic solution, comparative studies are performed on real-world and test system
data.
Owing to some limitations of the IIM, the dissertation also introduces an ex-
tended version of the model termed as Multi-scale Implicative Interdependency Re-
lation (MIIR) model. Utilizing the MIIR model, the K Contingency List problem is
i
solved with respect to the power network. The problem solves for a set of K enti-
ties which when failed would maximize the number of previously healthy entities to
fail eventually. Owing to the problem being NP-complete, a Mixed Integer Program
(MIP) to obtain the optimal solution and a polynomial time sub-optimal heuristic
are provided. The efficacy of the heuristic with respect to the MIP is compared by
using different test system data.
ii
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Chapter 1
INTRODUCTION
Critical Infrastructures of a nation like Power, Communication, Transportation Net-
works etc. exhibit strong intra-network and inter-network dependencies to drive their
functionalities. The symbiotic relationship that exists between Power and Communi-
cation network provides an example of the inter-network dependency. To elaborate
this further, consider entities of either network: electricity generation and power flows
are partially controlled by the Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA)
system through signals received from Remote Terminal Units (RTUs). Meanwhile,
every communication network entity involved in sensing, sending and controlling the
power grid are dependent on power network entities to ensure their successful oper-
ation. Owing to these dependencies, failure of some entities in either network may
eventually result in a cascading failure that can cause a widespread blackout in the
combined system.
Additionally, intra-network dependencies exist as well in a critical infrastructure
and is described with the help of power network. In an abstract level, a power network
is composed of the following entities — Generation Bus, Load Bus, Neutral Bus (or
zero injection bus) and Transmission Lines. When a transmission line trips, the power
flowing through the transmission lines needs to be redirected to satisfy load demand
of the load buses. This may cause the power flow in some other transmission line to
go beyond its line capacity causing it to trip. Eventually, these failures might result
in a cascade of trippings/failures resulting in a blackout. Cascading failures in power
and/or communication network due to intra/inter dependencies have disastrous effects
as seen in power blackouts which occurred in New York (2003) [1], San Diego (2011)
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[2] and India (2012) [3]. Thus modeling these dependencies is critical in understanding
and preventing such failures which might be triggered by natural as well as man-made
attacks.
In the last few years, there has been considerable activity in the research com-
munity to study Critical Infrastructure Interdependency. One of the earliest studies
on robustness and resiliency issues related to Critical Infrastructures of the U.S. was
conducted by the Presidential Commission on Critical Infrastructures, appointed by
President Clinton in 1996 [4]. Rinaldi et al. are among the first group of researchers
to study interdependency between Critical Infrastructures and to propose the use of
complex adaptive systems as models of critical infrastructure interdependencies [5],
[6]. Pederson et al. in [7], provided a survey of Critical Infrastructure Interdepen-
dency modeling, undertaken by U.S. and international researchers. Motivated by the
power failure event in Italy 2003, Buldyrev et al. in [8], proposed a graph-based inter-
dependency model, where the number of nodes in the power network was assumed to
be the same as the number of nodes in the communication network, and in addition
there existed a one-to-one dependency between a node in the power network to a node
in the communication network. The authors opine in a subsequent paper [9] that the
assumption regarding one-to-one dependency relationship is unrealistic and a single
node in one network may be dependent on multiple nodes in the other network. Lin
et al. presented an event driven co-simulation framework for interconnected power
and communication networks in [10], [11]. A game theoretic model for a multi-layer
infrastructure networks using flow equilibrium was proposed in [12].
As discussed above, a number of models have been proposed that capture the
dependencies in critical infrastructure systems [8], [9], [12], [13], [14], [15], [16], [17].
However, each of these models has their own shortcomings and a survey of these
models along with a detailed analysis of their functionality is presented in Chapter 2.
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Authors in [18] bring out the need to address the complex dependency which
can be explained through the following example. Let ax (which can be a generator,
substation, transmission line etc.) be a power network entity and bw, by, bz (which
can be a router, end system etc.) a set of communication network entities. Consider
the dependency where the entity ax is operational if (i) entities bw and (logical AND)
by are operational, or (logical OR) (ii) entity bz is operational. Models in [8], [13], [9],
[14], [12], [15], [16], [17] fails to capture this kind of dependency. Motivated by these
findings and limitations of the existing models, the authors in [18] proposed a Boolean
logic based dependency model termed as Implicative Interdependency Model (IIM). For
the example stated above, the dependency of ax on bw, by, bz can be represented as
ax ← bwby + bz. This equation representing the dependency of an entity is termed as
Interdependency Relation (IDR).
The IIM model forms the basis of this dissertation. Chapter 3 provides a more
detailed description along with the test data sets created using this model. The
IIM model is generic enough to capture the interdependencies in an interdependent
network as well as intra-network dependencies. The test data sets created in Chapter
3 are subdivided into two groups — (a) data sets capturing dependencies in power
network, and (b) data sets capturing dependencies in inter-dependent power and
communication network. Using these test data sets, the performance of different
solutions proposed for the problems in Chapters 4 - 7 of this dissertation are measured.
Chapters 4 - 7 discusses different problems and their solutions related to vulnera-
bility and protection analysis of critical infrastructure systems. These set of problem
utilizes the IIM model in their problem formulation and solutions. The first two
problems use the concept of hardening. An entity when hardened is considered to be
exempted from any kind of attack and can sustain itself without any dependency on
other entities. The Entity Hardening Problem is introduced in Chapter 4. It describes
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a situation where an operator, with a limited budget, must decide which entities to
harden, which in turn would minimize the damage, provided a set of entities fail ini-
tially. The Targeted Entity Hardening problem is discussed in Chapter 5 which is a
restricted version of the Entity Hardening problem. This problem presents a scenario
where the protection of certain entities is of higher priority. If these entities were to
be nonfunctional, the economic and societal damage would be higher when compared
to other entities being nonfunctional.
Modifying dependencies by adding additional dependency implications using en-
tities (termed as auxiliary entities) is shown to mitigate the issue of vulnerability in
intra/inter dependent systems to a certain extent. With this finding, the Auxiliary
Entity Allocation problem in introduced in Chapter 6. The objective of this problem
is to maximize protection in Power and Communication infrastructures using a bud-
get in the number of dependency modifications using the auxiliary entities. Chapter
7, a new metric of robustness using the IIM model is defined for inter/intra dependent
critical infrastructure systems. All the four problems are proved to be NP-complete.
For each of these problems, Integer Linear program to obtain the optimal solution is
proposed along with a sub-optimal heuristic with polynomial time complexity. The
test data sets are used to measure the efficacy of the heuristic solutions compared to
the Integer Linear program.
In the course of research, the IIM model is seen to have its own limitations. The
IDRs (i.e. dependency equations) form the core of the IIM model. Even though a
primary approach to create these dependency equations is shown in Chapter 3, they
are based on certain assumptions which might limit their applicability to real world
problems. Finding a generic technique to have a near accurate abstraction of an in-
tra/inter dependent critical infrastructure system is seen to be difficult using the IIM
model. To address this limitation, in Chapter 8 the Multi-scale Implicative Interde-
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pendency Relation (MIIR) model is proposed primarily focusing on intra-dependent
power network. Along with the IDRs, the MIIR model also takes into consideration
the power values (i.e. generation of a generator bus, power flowing through transmis-
sion lines etc.) of different entities in the system. These power values can be obtained
from Phasor Measurement Units (PMU) associated with the entities (there has been
considerable research on using PMU data in mitigating failure in power networks [19],
[20], [21], [22]). A formal description of the model along with its working dynamics
and a brief validation with respect to the 2011 Southwest Blackout are provided.
Utilizing the MIIR model, the K Contingency List problem is proposed. For a given
time instant, the problem solves for a set of K entities in a power network which
when failed at that time instant would cause the maximum number of previously
healthy entities to fail eventually. Owing to the problem being NP-complete a Mixed
Integer Program (MIP) is devised to obtain the optimal solution and a polynomial
time sub-optimal heuristic. The efficacy of the heuristic with respect to the MIP is
compared by using different power network test system data.
The dissertation is concluded in Chapter 9 with discussions on possible research
problems that can be pursued based on this research.
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Chapter 2
A SURVEY OF INTER-DEPENDENCY MODELS IN CRITICAL
INFRASTRUCTURE SYSTEMS
In the last few years there has been an increasing awareness in the research community
that the critical infrastructures of the nation do not operate in isolation. In fact,
they are closely coupled with other infrastructures such that the well being of one
infrastructure depends heavily on the well being of another. As an example, consider
the interdependent relationship between the power, communication, and transport
networks as shown in Figure 2.1 ([6]).
Figure 2.1: Power, Communication and Transportation Network Interdependency
If we focus exclusively on the power and communication networks we observe that
entities of the power grid, such as the Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition
(SCADA) systems, that control power stations and sub-stations, are dependent on
the communication network to receive their operational commands. While entities of
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the communication network, such as routers and cell towers, are dependent on the
power grid to remain operational. Compounding the complexity of analysis of this
symbiotic relationship between the two networks, is the effect of cascading failures
across these networks. For instance, not only can entities of the power networks, such
as generators and transmission lines, trigger a power failure, but also communication
network entities, such as routers and optical fiber lines, can trigger failures in the
power grid. Thus, it is essential that the interdependency between different types
of networks be understood well, so that preventive measures can be taken to avoid
cascading catastrophic failures in such multi-layered network environments.
With the continued focus for developing realistic failure propagation models that
aid in analyzing, and mitigating the effects of cascading faults across the entities
of the multi-layered network, several failure propagation models have been studied
that address the interdependency relationship between power, and communication
networks ([8, 14, 16, 15]), and space based networks ([23]).
A brief survey of the existing interdependency models for critical infrastructure
networks that have been proposed in the is presented. The chapter then address
the considerations that need to be taken into account for capturing the complex
interdependency that exists between power grid and communication networks in the
real world.
2.1 Interdependency Models
2.1.1 Buldyrev et al. Interdependency Model
Motivated by the electricity blackout in Italy (2003) ([24]) [8] proposed a cascading
failure model for interdependent networks. The power and communication infrastruc-
tures can be represented as networks. These networks are depicted as two connected
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graphs P (for power network) and C (for communication network) with same number
of nodes. To represent the interdependency between the networks, bidirectional links
between P and C, termed as P ↔ C edges, are considered with every node in each
graph connected to exactly one node in the other graph as shown in Figure 2.2(a).
In Figure 2.2(a) the interdependent network shown consists of power network nodes
p1, p2, p3 and p4 and communication network nodes c1, c2, c3 and c4. Blue and green
edges denote intra links in power and communication network respectively and black
edges denote the interdependency (inter links). These inter links represent the inter-
dependency relationship that a node in the power network is dependent on exactly
one node in the communication network and vice-versa. Thus capturing the fact that
a failure of a node in the power (communication) network causes the corresponding
node in the communication (power) network to fail.
Failures are considered in the model when a fraction of the nodes from any of the
two graphs P , or C are removed. Upon the introduction of a failure in the graph P ,
the failed nodes are removed and correspondingly, the nodes in the graph C that are
connected via P ↔ C edges to the attacked nodes are also removed. Parallel to the
node removals, any edge within graph P or C, or P ↔ C edges that do not have one
node at each end point are also simultaneously removed.
The cascade now proceeds as follows. In the first stage, the set of connected
components in the graph P is defined as P1 clusters. The set of C nodes connected
to the P1 clusters by P ↔ C edges are termed as C1 sets. Any edges in graph C,
that connects these C1 sets are removed. The set of connected components in graph
C after this removal of edges are defined as C2 clusters. In the second stage using
same procedure as that to find the c2 cluster and C1 sets, P2 sets from C2 clusters
and P3 clusters are obtained. In subsequent stages this cascade process then oscillates
between the two graphs until a steady state is reached when no further removal of
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edges in the graphs are possible. This is described through an example in Figure
2.2(a-c). The node p1 is attacked and removed from the graph P thus resulting in
P1 clusters consisting of two connected components having nodes {p1} and {p2, p4}
respectively. Node c3 in graph C fails due to its interdependency with node p3. The
corresponding C1 sets obtained due to these failures are {c1} and {c2, c4}. The edge
(c1, c4) is removed as it connects the two sets in C1. The corresponding C2 clusters
consist of connected components {c1} and {c2, c4}. The failure then reaches a steady
state as no edges can be removed in the next stage.
At the steady state, the interdependent network consists of mutually connected
clusters. Each mutually connected cluster consists of nodes having the properties (a)
the nodes in graphs P and C are completely connected, (b) each of these nodes which
belong to the graph P (C) has P ↔ C edge with graph C (P ). Note that there exists
no intra-links between any of the mutually connected clusters. In Figure 2.2(c) the
mutually connected clusters are thus {p1, c1} and {p2, p4, c2, c4}.
The largest mutually connected cluster is defined as the one having the maximum
number of nodes (cluster {p2, p4, c2, c4} in the example). Given a fraction 1 − p,
(0 ≤ p ≤ 1) of nodes that are removed from the interdependent network (due to a
failure), the ratio P∞ defines the number of nodes in the largest mutually connected
cluster at the steady state, as compared to the initial number of nodes in the network.
For the purpose of simulation and study, the power and communication networks are
considered as, coupled scale free, Erdos Reyni [25], and random networks. Different
values of P∞ were computed by varying the values of p, and the size of the network. It
was observed that, above a percolation threshold pc, the value of P∞ changes from the
neighborhood of zero to the neighborhood of one for a given network size. From this
observation the authors infer that when the fraction of failed node is below 1− pc of
the original number of nodes, the largest connected cluster has a size approximately
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Figure 2.2: Representation of Interdependency and Cascading Failure in Power and
Communication network as Demonstrated by Buldyrev et al.
equal to the size of initial pre-failure network. The percolation threshold pc for Erdos
Reyni networks is validated by analytical results.
In subsequent papers, Buldyrev et al. extend their work from their original cascad-
ing failure model (as discussed above), to interdependent networks with directional
dependency ([9]), and interdependency between more than one network ([13]).
One noticeable shortcoming of this model proposed by Buldyrev et al. is that
it does not distinguish between nodes in either network as separate entities. Nodes
in the power network may be functionally separate entities such as power plants,
sub-stations, and load nodes. Similarly, nodes in the communication network may be
functionally separate entities such as cell towers, and routers. When separate entities
of the network are considered, the proposed cascading model may not work in the
same way as assumed by the authors, and also the dependency relationship of one
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type of entity to the other may not be able to be captured with this model. Another
potential drawback to this model is for the functionality of the mutually connected
cluster. The mutually connected clusters generated after the cascade may not be
completely functional because of the physical limitations of the network ([17]). For
example, the nodes from the power grid in a mutually connected cluster may not be
able to provide sufficient power to the nodes in the communication network due to the
limits on the power generation capacities. Thus, it would be wrong to assume that
the residual mutually connected clusters continue to be functional after a cascade
simply because they remain connected.
2.1.2 Rosato et al. Coupling Model
[14] model the power flow in the power grid, and the data flow in the communi-
cation network separately. They then analyze the effect of failures in the communi-
cation network, caused by failures in the power grid using a coupling model between
the two infrastructures. Their analysis of the failure propagation is performed on the
backdrop of the Italian high voltage electric transmission network (HVIET), and the
high-bandwidth backbone of the Italian Internet network (GARR). Data for both the
networks were gathered from documentation available in the public domain.
For modeling the power network, the HVIET network is represented by an undi-
rected graph consisting of three type of vertices, namely, source nodes (nodes that
supply power to the network), load nodes (nodes that draw power out of the net-
work), and junction nodes (which neither draw nor supply power to network, but act
as relays). The edges of the graph corresponds to the transmission lines. The power
flow dynamics in the power grid relies on the DC power flow model as given by [26].
At every occurrence of a failure of one or more nodes, or transmission lines (edges),
the power flow dynamics are recalculated using this model. It is to be noted here
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that the DC power flow model considers the physical constraints pertaining to the
maximum power flow possible over a transmission line while computing the minimum
load re-dispatch (reducing the power drawn out by the load nodes) after a failure.
The authors define the quality of service (QoS) of the power network as the ratio
of the change in the total power drawn by the load nodes after the failure event, as
compared to the total power drawn by the load nodes before the failure event.
For modeling the communication network, the GARR network is represented as a
graph consisting of high-bandwidth backbone links as edges, and the Italian univer-
sities and research institutions as nodes. For computing the total amount of traffic
inflow into the network, the probability that a node generates a packet λ, (0 ≤ λ ≤ 1)
is considered at each time step. For each generated packet a random node is chosen as
its destination. A probabilistic packet routing model is considered along the lines of
[27] for sending the packets to their intended destinations. The average delivery time
is defined as the average of the packet transmission time from source to destination
over all packets delivered correctly within a particular time interval. The average
delivery time is then used as a metric to define the efficiency of the network for a
given value of λ.
The coupling between the two networks is achieved by associating a node from
the communication network to the closest load node from the power network (Eu-
clidean distance). Note that this coupling is one directional, that is, for a node to be
operational in the communication network it is dependent on a node from the power
network, but not vice-versa. In a failure event, if a load node i that was initially
extracting power P 0i units, now extracts Pi units of power after the subsequent load
re-dispatching process. The communication nodes coupled to i remain operational as
long as the value of Pi is greater than or equal to αP
0
i , (0 ≤ α ≤ 1). The coefficient
α is termed as the strength of coupling between the two networks.
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The authors then use the above coupling model to analyze and simulate the effect
of random link failures in the power network for a fixed parameter of α (taken as
α = 0.75). The main insight of their simulation is that even with small failure events
in the power (HVIET) network (small with respect to number of transmission lines
failed), the communication (GARR) network can get completely disconnected.
The individualized modeling of the power and communication network done by
Rostato et al. is realistic to a point, but the coupling model reflects only a one way
dependency model and fails to represent the interdependency that exists between
power and communication networks of today. This shortcoming may prohibit the
accurate cascading failure scenarios when the faults originate from the communication
network and cascade through to the power network.
2.1.3 Nguyen et al. Interdependency Model
In [16] propose a cascading model in similar lines of [8], and address the problem
for identifying the critical nodes in an interdependent network. In their model, the
power network, and communication network are considered as graphs Gs = (Vs, Es)
and Gc = (Vc, Ec), and the interdependency is represented by an unidirectional edge
set Esc that connect vertices from set Vs with set Vc in a composite graph containing
this edge set, and both the power, and communication networks graphs. A failure
due to a dependency relation is outlined by the assumption that, not only do the
failed node(s) cease to operate, but also the nodes connected to the failed nodes via
edges from the edge set Esc also become non-operational. Failures propagate in the
following way: the failed nodes and the incident edges to these nodes that belong to
Gs (power network), and Gc (communication network) are removed to generate G
′
s
and G′c respectively. Then, the largest connected components Ls and Lc are computed
for the graphs G′s and G
′
c. Any node ns ∈ G′s that does not belong to Ls, and any
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node nc ∈ G′c that does not belong to Lc are considered non-operational. Failures due
to the dependency relations are simultaneously considered, and propagation ensues
until a steady state is reached when no further nodes in either network can fail. An
example showing this failure propagation is shown in Figure 2.3 (a-c) where the power
network graph consist of nodes p1,p2,p3,p4 and communication network graph consist
of nodes c1, c2, c3, c4. Blue and green arcs represent edges in power and communication
network graph respectively and black arc represent the edges in Esc. A sample failure
propagation is described as follows — (a) The node p3 is attacked. (b) The edges
incident on node p3 are removed due to its failure along with its interdependent node
c3 in communication network and all its associated intra links. (c) The node p1 and c1
fails as it is disconnected from the largest connected component in the power network.
The steady state is reached with nodes p2 and p4 in power network and nodes c2 and
c4 in communication network as functional nodes after the failure event.
Figure 2.3: Representation of Interdependency and Cascading Failure in Power and
Communication Network as Demonstrated by Nguyen et al.
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Using the above defined failure propagation model, the authors consider the prob-
lem of identifying a set of critical nodes in the power network of size less than a positive
integer k, such that at the steady state the size of the largest connected component in
the power network is minimized. The authors show that this problem is NP-complete
by reduction from the decision version of the Maximum Independent Set problem,
and infer that this problem is in-approximable within a bound of 2− . Three greedy
approximation algorithms are proposed by the authors for approximating the solution
to this problem in polynomial time, namely, Maximum Cascade (Max-Cas), Iterative
Interdependent Centrality (IIC), and Hybrid.
The authors perform an extensive simulation of the proposed algorithms using
three different power network, and communication network data sets. The data sets
considered were (i) US Western States power network, and a synthetic scale free
communication network with an exponential factor, β = 2.2, (ii) Synthetic scale
free power network with β = 3.0, and a synthetic scale free communication network
with β = 2.2, and (ii) Scale free power and communication networks with the same
β = 2.6. For each of the simulations the interdependency relationship between the
two networks were setup using a random weighted permutation of nodes of the two
networks.
In the simulations it was observed that the Hybrid algorithm takes lesser time
and has better performance bounds than the other two algorithms. In the process
of the simulations, it was observed that when interdependent systems are loosely
connected they are more vulnerable to failure. Their observations also included that
sparse interdependent networks are more vulnerable to cascading failures. This was
observed from simulations carried out by varying the exponential factor of the scale
free communication network, while keeping the exponential factor of the power net-
work, and the total number of nodes constant. The simulations carried out by the
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authors by varying the total number of nodes of both the networks, while keeping
a fixed exponential factor of the considered scale free networks, showed that large
networks are more vulnerable to cascading failures.
The observable shortcomings of this model are similar to the drawbacks discussed
above for the model proposed by [8]. Without the distinction of nodes in the networks
into separate entities, such as power plants, and substations, for the power network,
and cell towers, and routers for the communication network, the failure cascading
model may not represent the workings of real world networks. Thus hindering the
analysis, and mitigation of faults caused by cascading failures in multi-layer critical
infrastructure networks.
2.1.4 Parandehgheibi et al. Interdependency Model
[15] also consider the power and communication infrastructure networks to analyze
the effect of cascading failures on these interdependent networks. In their model, the
power network graph P = (Vp, Ep) consist of vertices Vp representing the generators,
and substations, and edges Ep representing the transmission lines. Similarly, the
communication network graph C = (Vc, Ec) consist of vertices Vc representing the
control centers, and routers, edges Ec representing the communication lines. In the
graphs, it is assumed that nodes represented by generators, and control centers, are
autonomous, i.e. these nodes operate independently without any dependency on any
other node across both the networks. In this model, dependency between network
entities is represented by coupling the routers, and substations with edges E (directed
or undirected), in a composite graph of G = (V,E,Ep, Ec), V = Vp ∪ Vc. Whether
a node of this composite graph G is operational or not is defined by the following
functional rules: If the node represents a substation, it remains operational as long as,
(i) there exists a path between the substation and a generator via the power network
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edges Ep, and (ii) there exists a path between the substation and a router (to receive
control signals) via edges of E. If the node represents a router, it remains operational
as long as, (i) there exists a path between the router and a control center via the
communication network edges Ec, and (ii) there exists a path between the router
and a substation (to receive power) via edges of E. Lastly, if the node represents a
generator, or a control center, it remains continuously functional.
At the time of the initial failure (due to a possible attack, or fault), the failed
nodes, or edges are removed from the graph G. The failure propagation is then rep-
resented in the model by iteratively removing the failed nodes and all their incident
edges from graph G that do not satisfy the aforementioned functional rules. This
propagation continues until a steady state is reached when no further removals of
nodes, or edges are necessary. An example of the described failure propagation is
illustrated in Figure 2.4. In the figure the power network consists of a generator G
and substations s1, s2, s3 and communication network consists of control center C and
routers r1, r2, r3. Blue edges denotes the power network edges (composed of transmis-
sion lines) and green edges denotes the communication network edges (composed of
communication links). Black edges denotes the interdependency between substation
of power network and routers in communication network. An example of failure prop-
agation in this model is discussed as follows — (a) The substation s1 is attacked. (b)
Failure of substation s1 results in removal of all power network edges incident on s1
and failure of interdependent router r1 and removal of communication network edges
incident on it. (c) Substations s2, s3 and routers r2, r3 fails and hence are removed
as they do not satisfy both the properties for being being functional as mentioned.
The edges incident on these substations and routers are subsequently removed. The
resultant interdependent network after the failure consists of two autonomous nodes
G and C.
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Figure 2.4: Representation of Interdependency and Cascading Failure in Power and
Communication Network as Demonstrated by Parandehgheibi et al.
Keeping this failure model as their basis, the authors consider the problem of se-
lection of the minimum number of non-autonomous nodes (substations, and routers),
that need to be removed from the graph G, such that the resulting graph generated
at the steady state contains no non-autonomous nodes. The authors term this prob-
lem as the Node-MTFR (minimum total failure removal) problem. They also identify
another similar problem Edge-MTFR, that concentrates on the selection of the min-
imum number of edges of G such that the resulting graph generated at the steady
state contains no non-autonomous node.
For solving these two problems the authors assume that the power network graph
P , and the communication network graph C, are each star topology graphs. For
the power network, the substations are directly connected to a generator without
any connections between any other substations, i.e for all edges (u, v) ∈ Ep, node u
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represents a substation, and node v represents a generator. Similarly for the commu-
nication network the router are directly connected to a control center without any
connections between any other routers, i.e for all edges (u, v) ∈ Ec, node u repre-
sents a router node, and node v represents a control center node. The authors now
proceed to analyze the problem from the perspective of a bipartite graph, where the
nodes in the bipartite graph comprise of the substations of the power network, and
routers of the communication network (the nodes representing generators, and con-
trol centers are ignored). The edges of this bipartite graph is the set of dependency
relations represented by edge set E, of graph G. The authors analyze this problem
from two interdependency perspectives, namely, unidirectional interdependency, and
bi-directional interdependency.
For unidirectional dependency, the Node-MTFR problem is shown to be NP-
complete by reduction from the Feedback Vertex Set problem, and an optimal solution
is proposed by an integer linear program (ILP). A greedy approximation algorithm is
also proposed for this problem and its solution is compared with the optimal solution
obtained from the ILP. The authors also prove that Edge-MTFR problem for unidi-
rectional interdependency is NP-complete by reduction from the Feedback Edge Set
problem.
For bidirectional interdependency, the authors show that the Node-MTFR prob-
lem corresponds to a minimum vertex cover problem for bipartite graphs, and us-
ing Konig’s Theorem, they show that this problem is equivalent to the maximum
matching problem for bipartite graphs which has a known polynomial time solvable
algorithm [28]. The authors also observe that for the Edge-MTFR problem with bidi-
rectional interdependency all the edges of the bipartite graph must necessarily be re-
moved, as any existing edge would denote the existence of operating non-autonomous
nodes.
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For the purpose of experimentation and simulation, the authors use the Italian
communication and power network data obtained from [14]. To preserve the star
topology configuration for the power and communication networks, only substations
directly connected to the generators, and routers directly connected to control centers
are considered. Unidirectional dependency between the substations and routers is
established by assuming that a substation receives control signals from the nearest
router, and a router receives power from the nearest substation. Using this setup the
simulation is carried out to find the minimum number of nodes representing routers
and substations that need to be removed, such that all non-autonomous nodes are
removed from the graph (Node-MTFR). The experimental results showed that the
north-western part of Italy is acutely vulnerable as removal of just three routers
results in the failure of all substations and remaining routers.
A possible drawback to this model is that this model is able to represent depen-
dencies that are in disjunctive form, for example, a sub-station survives as long it
has a connection to a router. However, if there is a need to model a conjunctive
dependency among network entities this model may not be adequate, for example,
a scenario where a sub-station survives only when it is connected to two routers.
In the real world, it is highly likely that entities in either the power or communica-
tion network have such conjunctive dependency amongst other entities, which this
model may not be able to adequately represent. Another possible shortcoming of this
model is the number of types of power, and communication entities that this model
considers. For instance, in a real world communication network there may be com-
munication entities such as cell towers whose survivability may have to be modeled
very differently than the way routers are modeled. In the proposed model if support
for additional entities are included that have different functional rules, it is not clear
how this model will be able to accommodate them.
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2.1.5 Castet et al. Interdependency Model
[23] develop a model for survivability analysis of networks with heterogeneous
nodes (nodes that can perform more than one function), and apply their approach to
space-based networks. The authors propose that heterogeneous networks can be mod-
eled as interdependent multi-layer networks, thus enabling survivability analysis of
these networks. They assert that in this approach, the multi-layer aspect captures the
common functionalities across the different nodes (by construction of homogeneous
sub-networks), and the interdependency aspect captures the physical characteristics
of each node in the network.
In this paper the authors focuses on space-based networks (SBNs). In SBNs, each
network entity (space-craft), may perform more than one function. SBN’s operate by
physically distributing functions in multiple orbiting space-crafts that are wirelessly
connected to each other. The SBNs architecture allows the sharing of resources
on-orbit, such as data processing, data storage, and downlinks among the network
entities. In this study, Castet et al. attempt to assess their proposed approach of
modeling heterogeneous networks as interdependent multi-layer networks on SBNs,
and benchmark the survivability of a fractionated SBN architecture, against that of
a traditional monolith spacecraft.
To represent the heterogeneous SBN as a multi-layer interdependent network the
authors define the following terms: (a) Super-Node: A network entity that supports
multiple functionalities, (b) Node: Component of a super-node that represents a single
functionality of that super-node, (c) Layer: Set of nodes with the same functionality,
(d) Intra-Layer Link: A link between two nodes in the same layer. The link can
be directed (when one node is providing a resource and the other is receiving), or
undirected (both provide, and receive resources), (e) Networked Layer: A network
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possessing intra-layer links, and (f) Inter-Layer Link: A directed link that captures the
inter-dependency between functionalities (nodes) within a super-node. Specifically,
this link implies the (directed) propagation of failure from one node to the other.
In their model two types of inter-layer links are considered that represent the two
types of failure propagation possible in the model: (i) Inter-links for the kill effect
failure propagation, defined by the propagation rule as follows: When a node fails,
all nodes that have an incoming inter-link of this type from the failed node imme-
diately fail, and (ii) Inter-links for the precursor effect failure propagation, defined
by a conditional propagation rule as follows: When a node fails, and all the nodes
with incoming intra-links to this failed node have also failed, all entities that have
an incoming inter-link of this type from the failed node fails. This type of inter-link
implicitly implies that as long as a super-node has access to a particular functionality,
either from its own resources or from another super-node, all nodes in the super-node
dependent on this functionality survive. Figure 2.5 demonstrates the propagation
rules and represents a sample SBN as an interdependent multi-layer network N de-
fined by N(G1, ..., GL, Ek, Ep), where:
L is the number of layers each numbered sequentially from 1 to L
G1, ...., GL are the graphs on each layer :
∀l ∈ [1, ..., L], Gl = (Vl, El) with :
Vl is the set of nl nodes in Gl
El is the set of intra− layer links in Gl
Ek is the set of inter − layer links representing the ”kill effect”
Ep is the set of inter − layer links representing the ”precursor effect”
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In Figure 2.5 the interdependent space based network consist of three layers repre-
sented by graphs G1 = ({1, 2}, {(1, 2), (2, 1)}), G2 = ({3, 4}, ∅), G2 = ({5}, ∅). Edge
set Ek = {(3, 1), (3, 5), (4, 2)} and edge set Ep = {(1, 3), (1, 5), (2, 4)}. If node 3 fails,
nodes 1 and 5 immediately fail (kill effect). If node 1 fails then nodes 3 and 5 don’t
fail unless node 2 also fails (precursor effect).
To analyze the survivability of an interdependent multi-layer network using the
above network representation, and propagation rules, the authors carry out the fol-
lowing steps: (i) Generate the time to failure for each node and intra-layer link, (ii)
propagate failures through inter-layer links for the kill effect, (iii) propagate failures
through inter-layer links for the precursor effect, and (iv) combine all failure propaga-
tion effects to obtain the probability of failure of each node. Random times to failure
for the nodes were generated using cumulative distribution functions representing the
failure behavior of each node. Since links between two space-crafts (super-nodes) is
established through a wireless unit, a two step process was followed for generating the
times to failure for the intra-layer links: (i) times to failure of the wireless units on
each spacecraft was generated using predetermined cumulative distribution functions,
(ii) times to failures for each intra-layer link was generated by taking the minimum
of the time to failures of the two associated wireless units.
For simulation and study, the authors apply their model into three different SBN
scenarios. In their first scenario they consider three different space network archi-
tectures. The first architecture considered consists of a traditional monolith space-
craft with three subsystems (or layers), namely, Telemetry Tracking and Command
(TTC), supporting subsystems, and payload. The second architecture consists of two
space based networks, one of them a traditional monolith spacecraft, while the other
spacecraft consists of two subsystems — TTC and supporting subsystems. The two
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Figure 2.5: Representation of Interdependency and Cascading Failure in Power and
Communication Network as Demonstrated by Castet et al.
spacecrafts shares their TTC subsystems, i.e. a TTC redundancy is introduced,
through a wireless link. This architecture is shown in Figure 2.5 with layer 1,2 and
3 denoting subsystems TTC, supporting subsystems, and payload respectively. A
third architecture is considered which is comprised of the monolith spacecraft, and
two spacecrafts having two subsystems — TTC and supporting subsystems. These
three spacecrafts share there TTC subsystems, i.e. there is a higher degree of TTC
redundancy, through wireless links. Wireless links in the second and third spacecraft
architecture are assumed to be perfect. The distribution of probability of unavailabil-
ity (failure) of TTC subsystem with time, identified as a major spacecraft unreliability
factor in [29], is obtained from [30]. The probability of unavailability of the payload
subsystem over time, for the three spacecrafts is computed considering the failure of
the TTC subsystem using a Monte Carlo Simulation. The simulation results showed
that for a given time, increasing the redundancy of the TTC subsystems reduces the
probability of unavailability of the payload. However, it was observed that the per-
centage of this reduction is not linear with the redundancy introduced.
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The second scenario was aimed to study the impact of wireless link failure. A
Weibull distribution is considered for probability of unavailability of wireless link
failure with time. The parameters of Weibull distribution are set such that the wireless
link has a probability of 0.5 to fail after 15 years. Simulations were carried out
to compute the probability of unavailability of payload for the second architecture
of the first application with the given wireless link failure distribution. The result
is compared with the first and second architecture with perfect wireless link (the
previous scenario). Compared with the first scenario, it was observed that for the
second architecture the probability of unavailability of payload increases with time
when wireless link failure is considered. At a given point in time, it surpasses the
probability of unavailability of monolith spacecraft thus negating the effect of a TTC
redundancy. The conclusion that can be drawn from these observations are that
failure behavior of wireless links is a critical consideration to analyze the advantage
of space based networks with TTC redundancy, over adoption of traditional monolith
space crafts.
In the third scenario the authors consider a more complex space based network
by including two new subsystems into the traditional monolith spacecraft. The new
subsystems included are a Control Processor (CP) subsystem (the main computer
of the spacecraft), and a Data Handling (DH) subsystem (handling exchange and
storage of data). Another space craft is considered with all the subsystems as stated
except the payload. These two spacecrafts share DH, TTC and CP subsystems,
thus introducing redundancy. The resources are shared via wireless links. Hence the
space based network represented by this architecture has 5 layers with 3 networked
layer. The distribution of probability of unavailability of these subsystems with time
is obtained from [30]. Assuming perfect wireless link, a Monte Carlo simulation is
carried out to compute the probability of unavailability of payload with time. The
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simulation result is compared with traditional monolith spacecraft, and the second
spacecraft architecture’s (from the first scenario) payload failure distribution. It is
observed that after 15 years this architecture reduces the risk of failure by 20.5% over
the monolith spacecraft. This makes way to draw a conclusion that this architecture
has greater improvement in reduction of failure over monolith spacecraft, than by
only introducing TTC redundancy (as considered in first scenario).
2.1.6 Limitations of Current Modeling Approaches and Possible Solutions
As discussed, significant efforts have been made in the research community in the
last few years to develop an appropriate model of interdependency between the entities
of a multi-layer critical infrastructure network. Unfortunately, many of the proposed
models are overly simplistic in nature and as such they fail to capture the complex
interdependency that exists between power grid and communication networks. As
noted in Section 2.1.1, the highly cited paper due to [8], assume that every node in
one network can depend on one and only one node of the other network. Obviously,
this assumption is not valid in an interdependent power-communication network that
spans countries and continents. Even the authors in a follow up paper [13] recognize
that the assumption may not be valid in the real world and a single node in one
network may depend on more than one node in the other network and vice-versa. A
node in one network may be functional (“alive”) as long as one supporting node on
the other network is functional.
Although this generalization can account for disjunctive dependency of a node in
the A network (say ai) on more than one node in the B network (say, bj and bk),
implying that ai may be “alive” as long as either bi or bj is alive, it cannot account
for conjunctive dependency of the form when both bj and bk has to be alive in order
for ai to be alive. In a real network the dependency is likely to be even more complex
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involving both disjunctive and conjunctive components. For example, ai may be alive
if (i) bj and bk and bl are alive, or (ii) bm and bn are alive, or (iii) bp is alive. The
graph based interdependency models proposed in the literature [14, 16, 15, 9, 23, 12]
including [8, 13] cannot capture such complex interdependency between entities of
multi-layer networks.
This dissertation as whole addresses this problem. It also describes the Implicative
Interdependency Models which can capture dependencies between two infrastructures
as well as dependencies that exist in a single infrastructure. In the course of this dis-
sertation, some critical problems related to infrastructure systems which are beneficial
in real world applications are described and solved.
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Chapter 3
THE IMPLICATIVE INTER-DEPENDENCY MODEL
The need for a model to capture the complex intra and inter network dependencies
is elaborated through a descriptive example of interdependent power and commu-
nication network. Consider the system shown in Figure 3.1 where the power net-
work entities such as generators, transmission lines and substations are denoted by
a0 through a11 and communication entities such as GPS transmitters and satellites
are denoted by b0 through b4. The Smart Control Center (SCC) is represented by
the variable c0 as it is a part of both the power and the communication network.
For the SCC to be operational, it must receive electricity either from the generator
via the different power grid entities, or from the battery. Similarly, the function-
ing of the generator will be affected if it fails to receive appropriate control signals
from the SCC. The mutual dependency between the generator and the SCC can be
expressed in terms of two implicative dependency relations — (i) a11 ← b4c0, (ii)
c0 ← (b0b3(b1 + b2))(a0a1 + a2a3a4a5a6a7a8a9a10a11). It may be noted that the SCC
will not be operational if it does not receive electric power produced at the gener-
ating station and carried over the power grid entities to the SCC and its battery
backup also fails. This dependency can be expressed by the implicative relation
c0 ← a0a1 + a2a3a4a5a6a7a8a9a10a11 implying that c0 will be operational (i) if entities
a0 and a1 are operational, or (ii) if entities a2 through a11 are operational. However,
the SCC will also not be operational if it does not receive data from the communica-
tion system (IEDs, satellites, etc.). This dependency can be expressed by the relation
c0 ← (b0b3(b1+b2)). This implies that c0 will be operational (i) if entities b1 or b2 is op-
erational, and (ii) if entities b0 and b3 are operational. Combining the dependency of
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the SCC on the power grid and the communication network, the consolidated depen-
dency relation can be expressed as c0 ← (b0b3(b1+b2))(a0a1+a2a3a4a5a6a7a8a9a10a11).
Likewise, the dependency relation for the generating station can be expressed as
a11 ← b4c0, implying that the generating station will not be operational unless it
receives appropriate signals from the SCC c0, carried over wired or wireless link b4.
These two implicative relations demonstrate that dependency (or interdependency)
is a complex combination of conjunctive and disjunctive terms. We term the model
capturing this complex dependencies and interdependencies as Implicative Interde-
pendency Model.
Figure 3.1: Example of Power - Communication Infrastructure Interdependency
In the IIM an intra-network or inter-network critical infrastructure system is repre-
sented by I(E,F(E)), where E is the set of entities and F(E) is the set of dependency
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relations. Throughout this dissertation, an intra-dependent critical infrastructure or
interdependent critical infrastructure is termed as system denoted by I(E,F(E)).
The dynamics of the model is explained through an example. Consider sets A and B
(with E = A ∪ B) representing entities in power and communication network (say)
with A = {a1, a2, a3} and B = {b1, b2, b3, b4} respectively. The function F(E) giving
the set of dependency equations are provided in Table 3.1. In the given example,
an IDR b3 ← a2 + a1a3 implies that entity b3 is operational if entity a2 or entity a1
and a3 are operational. In the IDRs each conjunction term e.g. a1a3 is referred to as
minterms.
Power Network Comm. Network
a1 ← b2 b1 ← a1 + a2
a2 ← b2 b2 ← a1a2
a3 ← b4 b3 ← a2 + a1a3
−− b4 ← a3
Table 3.1: IDRs for the Constructed Example
Initial failure of entities in A∪B would cause the failure to cascade until a steady
state is reached. As noted earlier, the event of an entity failing after the initial failure
is termed as induced failure. Failure in IIM proceeds in unit time steps with initial
failure starting at time step t = 0. Each time step captures the effect of entities
killed in all previous time steps. We demonstrate the cascading failure for the system
outlined in Table 3.1 through an example. Consider the entities a2 and a3 fail at time
step t = 0. Table 3.2 represents the cascade of failure in each subsequent time steps.
In Table 3.2, for a given entity and time step, ′0′ represents the entity is operational
and ′1′ non operational. In this example a steady state is reached at time step t = 3
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Entities Time Steps (t)
0 1 2 3 4 5 6
a1 0 0 1 1 1 1 1
a2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
a3 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
b1 0 0 0 1 1 1 1
b2 0 1 1 1 1 1 1
b3 0 1 1 1 1 1 1
b4 0 1 1 1 1 1 1
Table 3.2: Failure Cascade Propagation when Entities {a2, a3} Fail at Time Step
t = 0. A Value of 1 Denotes Entity Failure, and 0 Otherwise
when all entities are non operational. IIM also assumes that the dependent entities
of all failed entities are killed immediately at the next time step. For example at time
step t = 1 entities a2, a3, b2, b3 and b4 are non operational. Due to the IDR a1 ← b2
entity a1 is killed immediately at time step t = 2. At t = 3 the entity b1 is killed due
to the IDR b1 ← a1 + a2 thus reaching the steady state.
As noted earlier the model captures the cascading failure that propagates through
the entities on an event of initial failure. Consider E = A ∪ B with A and B
representing entities in two separate critical infrastructures. The cascading failure
process is shown diagrammatically in Figure 3.2 with sets A0d ⊂ A and B0d ⊂ B
failing at t = 0. Accordingly, cascading failure in these systems can be represented
as a closed loop control system shown in Figure 3.3. The steady state after an initial
failure is analogous to the computation of fixed point of a function G(.) such that
G(Apd∪Bpd) = Apd∪Bpd , with steady state reached at t = p. It can be followed directly
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Figure 3.2: Cascading Failures Reach Steady State after p Time Steps
Figure 3.3: Cascading Failures as a Fixed Point System
that for a system with |E| = m, any initial failure would cause the system to reach a
steady state within m− 1 time steps.
In the following section, methodologies for generating dependency equations for
intra-dependent power network and inter dependent power and communication net-
work are discussed. This methodologies are priliminary steps in deriving the depen-
dency equations for a given intra/inter dependent critical infrastructure system. The
dependency equation generation strategies are used to create test data sets to measure
the efficacy of the solutions proposed for the problems that use IIM.
3.1 Generating IDRs
3.1.1 Generating Dependency Equations for Power Network
In this subsection, we describe a strategy to generate dependency equations of an
intra-dependent power network. We restrict to load bus, generator bus, neutral bus
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and transmission line as the entities in the power network. For a given power network,
AC power equations are solved to determine the direction of flow in the transmission
lines. We use the power flow solver available in MatPower software for different bus
systems [31]. For a given set of buses and transmission lines, the MatPower software
uses load demand of the bus, impedance of the transmission lines etc. to solve the
power flow and outputs the voltage of each bus in the system. We restrict to real
power flow analysis. For a given solution, the real part of generation is taken as the
power generated by a generator bus. Similarly, the real part of the load demand
is taken as demand value of a load bus. For two buses e1 and e2 connected by a
transmission line e12 the power flowing through the transmission line is calculated as
P12 = Real(V1 ∗ (V1−V−2I12 )∗), where V1 is the voltage at bus e1, V2 is the voltage at
bus e2, I12 is the impedance of the transmission line e12 and (
V1−V−2
I12
)∗ denotes the
complex conjugate of (V1−V2
I12
). P12 is the real component of the power flowing in the
transmission line e12. Power flows from bus e1 to e2 if P12 is positive and from bus e2
to e1 otherwise.
Dependency Equations
L1 ← T1G1
L2 ← T2L1 + T7N2
L3 ← T3L1 + T4N1
L4 ← T6N1 + T8N2
N1 ← T5G3
N2 ← T9G2
Table 3.3: IDRs of the Buses in Figure 3.4
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Figure 3.4: Example of Power Network Dependency
The generation of the dependency equation is explained through a nine bus sys-
tem shown in Figure 3.4. The figure represents a system I(E,F(E)) with set E
consisting of generator buses from G1 through G3, load buses L1 through L4, neutral
buses {N1, N2} and transmission lines T1 through T9. The values in the red blocks
denote the amount of power a generator is generating, the green block being the load
requirements and blue neutral (value of 0). The value in the grey blocks correspond
to power flow in the transmission lines. The transmission lines don’t have any IDR.
The IDRs for a bus b1 is constructed by the following — (a) let b2, b3 be the buses
and b12 (between b1 and b2) and b13 between (b1 and b3) be the transmission lines
for which power flows from these buses to b1, (b) the dependency equation for the
bus b1 is constructed as conjunction of minterms of size 2 (consisting of the bus from
which power is flowing and the transmission line) with each conjunction correspond-
ing to bus that has power flowing to it. For this example the dependency equation
b1 ← b12b2 + b13b3 is created. Using this definition the dependency equations for the
buses in Figure 3.4 are created and is shown in Table 3.3.
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The following points are to be noted regarding the generation rule — (a) The
transmission lines can only fail initially due to a man made attack or natural disaster.
Hence it entails the underlying assumption that the transmission lines would have
enough capacity to transmit any power that is required to flow in it, (b) The generator
bus is also only susceptible to initial failure and is assumed to have a generation
capacity that is enough to supply the power demanded by a instance of power flow,
(c) Neutral and Load buses are prone to both initial and induced failure. For example
consider the failure of transmission lines T9 and T1 at t = 0. Owing to this the load
bus L1 and neutral bus N2 fails at t = 2. At t = 3 load bus L2 fails due to the failure
of buses L1, N2. It is to be noted that load bus L3 does not fails as it still receives
power from N1 as transmission line T4 is expected to have a capacity that can support
a power flow equal to the demand of L3.
Owing to the underlying assumptions in the the creation of dependency equa-
tions, there is a limitation to its applicability to real world problems. However, with
respect to power network, creating dependency equations like the one discussed is a
preliminary step. Further research is required to be done to have a more accurate
abstract representation of the dependency equations that can have widespread appli-
cability to real world problems. The purpose of this subsection is — (1) presenting a
preliminary way the dependency equations can be generated for power network, (2)
larger data sets that can be used to measure the performance of the optimal solution
to the heuristic.
3.1.2 Generating Dependency Equations for Interdependent Power-Communication
Network
In this subsection, we describe rules to generate dependency relations for interde-
pendent power and communication network infrastructure as used in [18]. Real world
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Figure 3.5: Snapshot of the Power Network
data of Maricopa County, Arizona , USA was taken. This county is one of the most
densest populated region of Arizona with approximately 60% residents. Specifically,
we wanted to measure the amount of resource required to protect entities in partic-
ular regions of the county when these regions have a set of entities failing initially.
The data for power network was obtained from Platts (http://www.platts.com/) that
contains 70 generator buses (including solar homes that generate minuscule unit of
power) and 470 transmission lines. The communication network data was obtained
from GeoTel (http://www.geo-tel.com/) consisting of 2, 690 cell towers, 7, 100 fiber-lit
buildings and 42, 723 fiber links. Figures 3.5 and 3.6 displays the snapshot of power
network and communication network for a particular region of Maricopa county. In
Figure 3.5 the orange dots represent the generator buses and continuous yellow lines
represent the transmission lines. In Figure 3.6 fiber-lit buildings are represented by
pink dots, cell towers by orange dots and fiber links by continuous green lines.
The load of the power network are assumed to be cell towers and fiber-lit build-
ings. There exist other entities that draws electrical power. Since it is not relevant
for the comparative analysis of the heuristic and the ILP such entities are ignored.
The interdependent power-communication system is represented mathematically as
I(E,F(E)) with E = A ∪ B. A and B consist of the entities in the power net-
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Figure 3.6: Snapshot of the Communication Network
work and communication network respectively. With respect to this data the power
network consist of three type of entities — generating stations, load (which are cell
towers and fiber-lit buildings) and transmission lines (denoted by a1, a2, a3 respec-
tively). The communication network comprises of the following type of entities —
cell towers, fiber-lit buildings and fiber links (denoted by b1, b2, b3 respectively). It is
to be noted that the fiber-lit buildings and cell towers are considered as both power
network entities as well as communication network entities. From the raw data the
dependency equations are constructed using the following rules.
Rules: We take into consideration that an entity in the power network is dependent
on a set of entities in the communication network for either being operational and
vice-versa. To keep things uncomplicated, we consider the dependency equations with
at most two minterms. For the same reason we consider the size of each minterm is
at most two.
Generators (a1,i, 1 ≤ i ≤ p, where p is the total number of generators): We assume
that every generator (a1.i) is, i) dependent on the closest Cell Tower (b1,j), or, ii)
closest Fiber-lit building (b2,k) and the corresponding Fiber link (b3,l) connecting b2,k
and a1,i. Hence, we have a1,i ← b1,j + b2,k × b3,l.
Load (a2,i, 1 ≤ i ≤ q, where q is the total number of loads): The power network loads
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do not depend on any entities in communication network
Transmission Lines (a3,i, 1 ≤ i ≤ r, where r is the total number of transmission
lines): The transmission lines in the power network do not depend on any entities in
communication network.
Cell Towers (b1,i, 1 ≤ i ≤ s, where s is the total number of cell towers): The Cell
Towers depend on two components, i) the closest pair of generators, and, ii) corre-
sponding transmission line, connecting the generator to the cell tower. Thus we have
b1,i ← a1,j × a3,k + a1,j′ × a3,k′ .
Fiber-lit Buildings (b2,i, 1 ≤ i ≤ t, where t is the total number of fiber-lit buildings):
The Fiber-lit Buildings depend on two components, i) the closest pair of generators,
and, ii) corresponding transmission line, connecting the generator to the fiber-lit
buildings. Thus we have b2,i ← a1,j × a3,k + a1,j′ × a3,k′ .
Fiber Links (b3,i, 1 ≤ i ≤ u, where u is the total number of fiber links): The Fiber
Links aren’t dependent on any power network entity. These links require power only
for the amplifiers connected to them. The amplifiers are required if the length of the
fiber link is above a certain threshold. We consider only those fiber links which are
’quite long’, need power. The fiber links depend on the closest pair of generators and
the transmission lines connecting the generators to the fiber link under consideration.
Thus we have b3,i ← a1,j × a3,k + a1,j′ × a3,k′ . We do not consider that these fiber
links need any power as we cannot determine the length of the fiber links or the exact
threshold value due to the lack of data.
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Chapter 4
THE ENTITY HARDENING PROBLEM
For an existing critical infrastructure system, an operator would have the capability
to measure the extent of failure when a certain set of entities fail initially. Consider
a scenario where an operator identifies a set of critical entities which when failed
initially would cause the maximum damage. In an ideal case, there would be enough
resources available to support those critical entities from initial failure. However, if the
availability of resources is a constraint, then an operator might have to choose entities
which when supported would minimize the damage. We define the entities to support
as the entities to harden and the problem as the Entity Hardening Problem. An entity
xi when hardened is resistant to both initial and induced failure (failing of entities in
the cascading process after the initial failure). In the physical world, an entity can be
hardened with respect to cyber attacks (say) by having a strong firewall. Similarly
some entities can be hardened by — (a) strengthening their physical structures for
protection from natural disaster, (b) placing redundant entity a′ for an entity a which
can operate when a fails, (c) increasing physical limits of the entity (maximum power
flow capacity of the transmission line, maximum generation capacity of a generator
bus). There exist multiple such ways to harden an entity from different kind of
failures. Even though there may be circumstances under which an entity cannot be
hardened, we relax such possibilities and assume that there always exist a way to
harden a given entity. Hardening entities can prevent cascading failures caused by
some initial failure. Thus this results in protecting a set of entities including the
hardened entities from an initial failure trigger. Using these definitions the Entity
Hardening Problem finds a set of k entities that should be hardened (with k being
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the resource constraint) in an intra-network or inter-network critical infrastructure
system that protects the maximum number of entities from failure when a set of K
entities fail initially.
4.1 Problem Formulation
Before stating the problem formally, a brief understanding of entity hardening is
provided. Consider the system with set of dependency relations given by Table 3.1 of
Chapter 3. With an initial failure of entities a2, a3 the subsequent cascading failures is
shown in Table 3.2 which fails all the entities in the system. We note three instances
where entities a1, a2 and a3 are hardened separately with a2, a3 failing initially. The
failure cascade propagation when a1, a2 and a3 are hardened are shown in Tables 4.1,
4.2, and 4.3 respectively. In the tables the cascading failure is shown till t = 3 because
with initial failure of entities a2, a3 the cascade propagation stops at t = 3 as seen in
Table 3.2. Hardening entity a1 protect entities a1, b1 from failure. Similarly, when a2
is hardened it protect a1, a2, b1, b2, b3 and hardening a3 protect entities a3, b4. If the
hardening budget is 1 the operator would clearly harden the entity a2 as it protects
the maximum number of entities from failure. We now describe the entity hardening
problem formally.
The Entity Hardening (ENH) problem
INSTANCE: Given:
(i) A system I(E,F(E)), where the set E represent the set of entities, and F(E) the
set of IDRs.
(ii) The set of K initially failing entities E ′, where E ′ ⊆ E
(iii) Two positive integers k, k < K and EF .
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Entities Time Steps (t)
0 1 2 3
a1 0 0 0 0
a2 1 1 1 1
a3 1 1 1 1
b1 0 0 0 0
b2 0 1 1 1
b3 0 1 1 1
b4 0 1 1 1
Table 4.1: Failure Cas-
cade Propagation when
Entities {a2, a3} Fail at
Time Step t = 0 and a1
is Hardened
Entities Time Steps (t)
0 1 2 3
a1 0 0 0 0
a2 0 0 0 0
a3 1 1 1 1
b1 0 0 0 0
b2 0 0 0 0
b3 0 0 0 0
b4 0 1 1 1
Table 4.2: Failure Cas-
cade Propagation when
Entities {a2, a3} Fail at
Time Step t = 0 and a2
is Hardened
Entities Time Steps (t)
0 1 2 3
a1 0 0 1 1
a2 1 1 1 1
a3 0 0 0 0
b1 0 0 0 1
b2 0 1 1 1
b3 0 1 1 1
b4 0 0 0 0
Table 4.3: Failure Cas-
cade Propagation when
Entities {a2, a3} Fail at
Time Step t = 0 and a3
is Hardened
DECISION VERSION: Is there a set of entities H = E ′′, E ′′ ⊆ E, |H| ≤ k, such
that hardening H entities results in no more than EF entities to fail after entities in
E ′ fail at time step t = 0.
OPTIMIZATION VERSION: Find a set of k entities to harden which would maximize
the number of protected entities with entities in E ′ failing initially.
Definition: KillSet(S) : For an initial failure of set S, the set of entities that fail
due to induced failure in the cascading process including the entities in set S is de-
noted by KillSet(S).
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The following points are to be noted regarding the ENH problem — (a) the con-
dition k < K is assumed as with k ≥ K hardening the K initially failing entities
would ensure that there are no induced and initial failure. (b) with E ′ entities failing
initially, the entities to be harden are to be selected from KillSet(E ′). Hardening
entities outside KillSet(E ′) would not result in protection of any non-hardened entity.
4.2 Computational Complexity Analysis
The computational complexity of the ENH problem is provided in this section.
The problem is proved to be NP-complete. Additionally, approximate and polynomial
solutions to few subcases are provided. The subcases impose restrictions on the IDRs
and the solutions can be applied to systems whose dependency equations fall within
the definition of the restriction. We prove that the ENH problem is NP-complete
in Theorem 1. Using the results of Theorem 1 an in-approximability bound of the
problem is provided in Theorem 2.
Theorem 1. The ENH Problem is NP Complete
Proof. The Entity Hardening problem is proved to be NP complete by giving a re-
duction from the Densest p-Subhypergraph problem [32], a known NP-complete prob-
lem. An instance of the Densest p-Subhypergraph problem includes a hypergraph
G = (V,EV ), a parameter p and a parameter M . The problem asks the question
whether there exists a set of vertices |V ′| ⊆ V and |V ′| ≤ p such that the sub-
graph induced with this set of vertices has at least M hyperedges that are completely
covered. From an instance of the Densest p-Subhypergraph problem we create an in-
stance of the ENH problem in the following way. Consider a system I(E,F(E)) with
E = A∪B, where A and B are entities of two separate critical infrastructures depen-
dent on each other. For each vertex vi and each hyperedge ej entities bi and aj are
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added to the set B and A respectively. For each hyperedge ej with ej = {vm, vn, vq}
(say) an IDR of form aj ← bmbnbq is created. It is assumed that the value of K is set
of |V |. The values of k and EF are set to p and |V |+ |EV | − p−M (where |A| = |V |
and |B| = |E|) respectively.
In the constructed instance only entities of set A are dependent on entities of set
B. Additionally the dependency for an entity ai consists of conjunction of entities in
set B. Hence for an entity ai ∈ A to fail, either it itself has to fail initially or any one
of the entity that ai depends on has to fail. It is to be noted that the entities in set
B has no induced failure i.e., there is no cascade. Following from this assertion, with
K = |V ′|, failing entities in B would fail all entities in set A ∪ B. For this created
instance E ′ is set to B′
If an entity in set A is hardened then it would have no effect in failure prevention
of any other entities. Whereas hardening an entity bm ∈ B might result in failure
prevention of an entity ai ∈ A with IDR aj ← bmbnbq provided that entities bn, bq are
also defended. With k = p (and K ≤ |V | = |B|) it can be ensured that entities to be
defended are from set B′.
To prove the theorem, consider that there is a solution to the Densest p-Subhypergraph
problem. Then there exist p vertices which induces a subgraph which has at least
M hyperedges. Hardening the entities bi ∈ B′ for each vertex vi in the solution of
the Densest p-Subhypergraph problem would then ensure that at least M entities in
set A are protected from failure. This is because the entities in set A for which the
failure is prevented corresponds to the hyperedges in the induced subgraph. Thus the
number of entities that fail after hardening p entities is at most |V |+ |EV | − p−M ,
solving the ENH problem. Now consider that there is a solution to the ENH problem.
As previously stated, the entities to be hardened will always be from set B′. So de-
fending p entities from set B′ would result in failure prevention of at least M entities
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in set A such that EF ≤ |V | + |EV | − p −M . Hence, the vertex induced subgraph
would have at least M hyperedges completely covered when vertices corresponding
to the entities hardened are included in the solution of the Densest p-Subhypergraph
problem. Hence proved.
Theorem 2. For a system I(E,F(E)) with n = |E| and F(E) having IDRs of form
in the created instance of Theorem 1, the ENH problem is hard to approximate within
a factor of 1
2log(n)
λ for some λ > 0.
Proof. The ENH problem with IDRs of form in the created instance of Theorem
1 is a special case of the densest p-subhypergraph problem. In [32] the densest
p−subhypergraph problem is proved to be inapproximable within a factor of 1
2log(n)
λ
(λ > 0). The same result applied to the ENH problem as well. Hence the theorem
follows.
4.2.1 Restricted Case I: Problem Instance with One Minterm of Size One
The IDRs of this restricted case have a single minterm of size 1. This can be
represented as ei ← ej, where ei and ej are entities of a system I(E,F(E)). Algorithm
1 solves the ENH problem with this restriction optimally in polynomial time utilizing
the notion of Kill Set defined in Section 4.1 with proof of optimality given in Theorem
3.
Theorem 3. Algorithm 1 solves the Entity Hardening problem for the Restricted Case
I optimally in polynomial time.
Proof. It is shown in [18] that the kill set for all entities in a system can be computed
in O(n3) where n = |E|. Thus computing the kill sets of K entities would have a
time complexity of O(Kn2). Each update in line 8 would take O(n) time and hence
the total computation of the inner for loop can be done in O(Kn). The outer for
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Algorithm 1: Entity Hardening Algorithm for systems with Restricted Case I
type of dependencies
Data: A system I(E,F(E)), set of K entities failing initially E′, E′ ⊆ E, hardening
budget k
Result: Set of hardened entities H
1 begin
2 For each entity ei ∈ E′ compute the set of kill sets and store it in a set
C = {Ce1 , Ce2 , ..., CeK}, where Cei = KillSet(ei) ;
3 Set H = ∅ ;
4 for (i=1; i ≤ K; i++) do
5 Choose the set Cek having the highest cardinality from C ;
6 Update C ← C \ Cek ;
7 for Cej ∈ C do
8 Update Cej ← Cej \ Cek ;
9 Update H ← H∪ {ek};
10 If all Kill Sets are empty then break ;
11 return H
loop iterates for K times thus the time complexity of lines 4 − 9 is O(K2n). Hence
Algorithm 1 runs in O(Kn2).
For two kill sets Cei and Cej , it can be shown that either Cei∩Cej = ∅ or Cei∩Cej =
Cei or Cei ∩ Cej = Cej [18]. Using this assertion the set E ′ can be partitioned into
disjoint subsets EX1 , EX2 , .., EXm where kill sets of two entities ea, ebhave no elements
in common with ea ∈ EXi and eb ∈ EXj and i 6= j. Additionally, for any given subset
of entities EXz there exist an entity ek ∈ EXz whose kill set is a super set of kill sets
of all other entities in EXz . Thus each of the disjoint subset has an entity whose kill
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set is the super set among all other entities in that subset. Algorithm 1 chose such an
entity in line 5 for every iteration and updates in line 8 would make the kill set of all
the remaining entities in the partition to be empty and hence would not be hardened
in future iterations. Clearly choosing these entities would globally maximize the total
number of protected entities from failure. Hence the Algorithm 1 is proved to be
optimal.
4.2.2 Restricted Case II: Problem Instance with an Arbitrary Number of Minterms
of Size One
The IDRs of this restricted case have arbitrary number of minterm of size 1.
This can be represented as ei ←
∑p
q=1 eq, where ei and eq are entities of a system
I(E,F(E)) and the number of minterms are p. The ENH problem with respect
to this restricted case is NP-complete and is proved in Theorem 4. We provide an
approximation bound for this restricted case of the problem in Theorem 6 using the
results of Theorem 4. The approximation bound uses the notion of Protection Set.
The Protection Set of an entity can be computed in O((n)2) where n = |E| and m
are number of minterms.
Definition: For an entity ei ∈ E the Protection Set is defined as the entities that
would be prevented from failure by hardening the entity ei when all entities in E
′ fail
initially. This is represented as P (xi|E ′).
Theorem 4. The ENH problem for Restricted Case II is NP Complete
Proof. The ENH problem for case III is proved to be NP complete by giving a reduc-
tion from the Set Cover Problem. An instance of the Set Cover problem is given by a
set S = {x1, x2, ..., xn} of elements, a set of subsets S = {S1, S2, ..., Sm} where Si ⊆ S
and a positive integer M . The decision version of the problems finds whether there
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exist at most M subsets from set S whose union would result in the set S. From
an instance of the set cover problem we create an instance of the ENH problem in
the following way. Consider a system I(E,F(E)) with E = A ∪ B, where A and B
are entities of two separate critical infrastructures dependent on each other. For each
element xi in set S we add an entity ai in set A. For each subset Si in set S we add
an entity bi in set B. For all subsets in S, say Sp, Sm, Sn, which has the element xi
an IDR of form ai ← bm + bn + bl is added to F(E). The values of positive integers k
and EF are set to M and m−M respectively. It is assumed that the value of K = m
and E ′ = B.
The constructed instance ensures that the entities to be hardened are from set B.
This is because hardening an entity ai ∈ A would only result in prevention of its own
failure whereas hardening an entity bj ∈ B would result in failure prevention of its
own and all other entities in set A for which it appears in its IDR.
Consider there exists a solution to the Set Cover problem. Then there exist M
subsets whose union results in the set S. Hardening the entities in set B corresponding
to the subsets selected would ensure that all entities in set A are prevented from
failure. This is because for the dependency of each entity ai ∈ A there exist at least
one entity (in set B) that is hardened. Hence the number of entities that fails after
hardening is m − M which is equal to EF , thus solving the ENH problem. Now,
consider that there is a solution to the ENH problem. As discussed above the entities
to be hardened should be from set B′. To achieve EF = m −M with k = M , no
entities in the set A must fail. Hence for each entity ai ∈ A at least one entity in
set B that appears in its IDR has to be hardened. Thus, it directly follows that the
union of subsets in set S is equal to the set S, solving the Set Cover Problem. Hence
proved.
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Theorem 5. For two entities ei, ej ∈ A ∪ B, P (ei|E ′) ∪ P (ej|AE ′) = P (ei, ej|E ′)
when IDRs are in form of Restricted Case II.
Proof. Assume that defending two entities ei and ej would result in preventing failure
of P (ei, ej|E ′) entities with |P (ei|E ′) ∪ P (ej|E ′)| < |P (ei, ej|E ′)|. Then there exist
at least one entity ep /∈ P (ei|E ′) ∪ P (ej|E ′) such that it’s failure is prevented only if
ei and ej are protected together. So two entities em and en (with em ∈ P (ei|E ′) and
en ∈ P (ej|E ′) or vice versa) have to be present in the IDR of ep. As the IDRs are of
restricted Case II so if any one of em or en is protected then ep is protected, hence a
contradiction. On the other way round P (ei, ej|E ′) contains all entities which would
be prevented from failure if ei or ej is defended alone. So it directly follows that
|P (ei|E ′) ∪ P (ej|E ′)| > |P (ei, ej|E ′)| is not possible. Hence the theorem holds.
Theorem 6. There exists an 1 − 1
e
approximation algorithm that approximates the
ENH problem for Restricted Case II.
Proof. The approximation algorithm is constructed by reducing the problem for this
restricted case to Maximum Coverage problem. An instance of the maximum coverage
problem consists of a set S = {x1, x2, ..., xn}, a set S = {S1, S2, ..., Sm} where Si ⊆ S
and a positive integer M . The objective of the problem is to find a set S ′ ⊆ S and
|S ′| ≤ M such that ∪Si∈SSi is maximized. Consider a system I(E,F(E)) with E =
A ∪B, where A and B are entities of two separate critical infrastructures dependent
on each other. For a given initial failure set E ′ = A′ ∪ B′ with |A′| + |B′| ≤ K, let
P (ei|A′∪B′) denote the protection set for each entity ei ∈ A∪B. We construct a set
S = A ∪ B and for each entity ei a set Sei ⊆ S such that Sei = P (ei|A′ ∪ B′). Each
set Sei is added as an element of a set S. The conversion of the problem to Maximum
Coverage problem can be done in polynomial time. By Theorem 5 defending a set
of entities X ⊆ S would result in failure prevention of ∪ei∈XSxi entities. Hence,
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with the constructed sets S and S and a positive integer M (with M = k) finding
the Maximum Coverage would ensure the failure protection of maximum number of
entities in A ∪ B. This is same as the ENH problem of Restricted Case II. As there
exists an 1 − 1
e
approximation algorithm for the Maximum Coverage problem hence
the same algorithm can be used to solve this restricted case of the ENH problem using
this transformation.
4.3 Optimal and Heuristic Solution to the Problem
Owing to the problems being NP-complete, we provide an optimal solutions to the
problem by formulating Integer Linear Program (ILP). We also provide sub optimal
heuristic that runs in polynomial time.
4.3.1 Optimal Solution using Integer Linear Programming
We propose an Integer Linear Program (ILP) that solves the ENH problem opti-
mally. For a system I(E,F(E)) let G = {g1, g2, ..., gn} be variables denoting entities
in set E. Given an integer K, G is a array of K 1’s and n − K 0’s where gi = 1 if
the entity ei ∈ E fails at t = 0 and gi = 0 if the the entity is operational at t = 0.
Thus the array G gives the set of K entities failing initially. Additionally for each
entity ej ∈ E a set of variables xjd with 0 ≤ d ≤ n− 1 and d ∈ I+ ∪ {0} are created.
The value of xjd = 1 denotes that the entity xj is in failed state at t = d and xjd = 0
denotes it is operational. As noted earlier for |E| = n the cascade can proceed till
n− 1 so the range of d is [0, n− 1]. Using these definitions the objective of the ENH
problem is as follows —
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min
( n∑
i=1
xi(n−1)
)
(4.1)
The constraints guiding the problem are as follows:
Constraint Set 1:
n∑
i=1
qxi ≤ k , with qxi ∈ [0, 1]. If an entity xi is hardened then qxi = 1
and 0 otherwise.
Constraint Set 2: xi0 ≥ gi − qxi . This constraint implies that only if an entity is
not defended and gi = 1 then the entity will fail at the initial time step.
Constraint Set 3: xid ≥ xi(d−1), ∀d, 1 ≤ d ≤ n − 1, in order to ensure that for an
entity which fails in a particular time step would remain in failed state at all subse-
quent time steps.
Constraint Set 4: Modeling of constraints to capture the cascade propagation for
IIM is similar to the constraints established in [18] with modifications to capture the
hardening process. A brief overview of this constraint is provided here. Consider
an IDR ei ← ejepel + emen + eq. The following steps are enumerated to depict the
cascade propagation with respect to this constraint:
Step 1: Replace all minterms of size greater than one with a variable. In the example
provided we have the transformed minterm as ei ← c1 + c2 + eq with c1 ← ejepel and
c2 ← emen (c1, c2 ∈ {0, 1}) as the new IDRs.
Step 2: For each variable c, a constraint is added to capture the cascade propagation.
Let N be the number of entities in the minterm on which c is dependent. In the exam-
ple for the variable c1 with IDR c1 ← ejepel, constraints c1d ≥ xj(d−1)+xp(d−1)+xl(d−1)N ∀d ∈
[1, n − 1] are introduced (N = 3 in this case). If IDR of an entity is already in
form of a single minterm of arbitrary size, i.e.,ei ← ejepel (say) then constraints
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xid ≥ xj(d−1)+xp(d−1)+xl(d−1)N − qxi and xid ≤ xj(d−1) + xp(d−1) + xl(d−1)∀d ∈ [1, n− 1] are
introduced (with N = 3). These constraints satisfies that if the entity ei is hardened
initially then it is not dead at any time step.
Step 3: Let M be the number of minterms in the transformed IDR as described
in Step 1. In the given example with IDR ei ← c1 + c2 + eq constraints of form
xid ≥ c1(d−1) +c2(d−1) +xq(d−1)− (M−1)−qxi and xid ≤ c1(d−1)+c2(d−1)+xq(d−1)M ∀d ∈ [0, 1]
are introduced. These constraints ensures that even if all the minterms of ei has at
least one entity in dead state then it will be alive if the entity is hardened initially.
With objective (4.1) along with the constraints minimize the number of entities failed
at the end of the cascading failure with a hardening budget of k and K entities failing
initially. The ILP gives an optimal solution to the ENH problem, however its run
time is non-polynomial.
4.3.2 Heuristic Solution
In this subsection we provide a greedy heuristic solution to the Entity Hardening
problem. For a given system I(E,F(E)) with set of entities E ′(|E ′| = K) failing
initially and hardening budget k, a heuristic is developed based on the following two
metrics — (a) Protection Set as defined in Section 6.1, (b) Cumulative Fractional
Minterm Hit Value (CFMHV).
Definition: The Fractional Minterm Hit Value of an entity ej ∈ E in a system
I(E,F(E)) is denoted as FMHV (ej, X). It is calculated as FMHV (ej, X) =∑m
i=1
1
|si| . In the formulation m are the minterms in which ej appears over all IDRs
except for the IDRs of entities in set X. The parameter si denotes i
th such minterm.
If entity ej is hardened (or protected from failure) then the computed value provides
an estimate of the future impact on protection of other non operational entities.
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Definition: The Cumulative Fractional Minterm Hit Value of an entity ej ∈ E is de-
noted as CFMHV (ej) where CFMHV (ej) =
∑
∀xi∈PS(ej |E′) FMHV (xi, PS(xi|E ′)).
This gives a measure of the future impact on protecting non functional entities when
the entity ej is hardened and entities PS(ej|E ′) are protected from failure.
Using these definitions a heuristic is formulated in Algorithm 2. For each iteration
of the while loop in the algorithm, the entity having highest cardinality of the set
PS(xi|E ′) is hardened. This ensures that at each step the number of entities pro-
tected is maximized. In case of a tie, the entity having highest Cumulative Fractional
Minterm Hit Value among the set of tied entities is selected. This causes the selec-
tion of an entity that has the potential to protect maximum number of entities in
subsequent iterations. Thus, the heuristic greedily maximizes the number of entities
protected when an entity is hardened at the current iteration with metric to measure
its impact of protecting other non operational entities in future iterations. Algorithm
2 runs in polynomial time, more specifically the time complexity is O(kn(n + m)2)
(where n = |E| and m = Number of minterms in F(E)).
4.4 Experimental Results
A comparative study of the ILP and heuristic solution for the ENH problems
is done in this section. A machine with intel i5 processor and 8 GB of RAM was
used to execute the solutions. The coding was done in java and a student licensed
IBM CPLEX external library file is used to execute the ILP. 8 different bus systems
available from MatPower with number buses 24, 30, 39, 57, 89, 118, 145, 300 were used
to generate the dependency equations for power network (using the rules described in
Section 3.1.1). The time to generate the dependency equations were less than 2ms.
Within the Maricopa county 4 disjoint regions were considered labeled as Region
1 through 4. Dependency equations for the interdependent power-communication
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Algorithm 2: Heuristic Solution to the ENH Problem
Data: A system I(E,F(E)), set of entities E′ failing initially with |E′| = K and
hardening budget k.
Result: Set of hardened entities H.
1 begin
2 Initialize H ← ∅ and D ← ∅;
3 Update F(E) as follows — (a) let Q be the set of entities that does not fail on
failing K entities, (b) remove IDRs corresponding to entities in set Q, (c)
update the minterm of remaining IDRs by removing entities in set Q;
4 Update E ← E \Q ;
5 while (|H| is not equal to k) do
6 For each entity ei ∈ E\D compute PS(ei|E′) and CFMHV (ei);
7 if There exists multiple entities having same value of highest cardinality of
the set PS(ei|E′) then
8 Let ep be an entity having highest CFMHV (ep) among all ep’s in the set
of entities having highest cardinality of the set PS(ei|A′ ∪B′);
9 If there is a tie choose arbitrarily;
10 Update H ← H∪ {ep}, D ← D ∪ PS(ep|E′);
11 Update F(E) by removing entities in PS(ep|E′) both in the left and
right side of the IDRs ;
12 else
13 Let ei be an entity having highest cardinality of the set PS(ei|E′);
14 Update H ← H∪ {ei}, D ← D ∪ PS(ei|E′);
15 Update F(E) by removing entities in PS(ei|E′) both in the left and right
side of the IDRs ;
16 return H ;
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network were generated for these regions using the rules described in Section 3.1.2.
The number of entities in each of the 12 data sets are enumerated in Table 4.4. To
determine the initially failing entities we used the ILP solution of K most vulnerable
entities in [18]. The K most vulnerable entities problem finds a set of K entities in
a system I(E,F(E)) which when failed at t = 0 causes the maximum number of
entities to fail. For a given data set representing a system I(E,F(E)), the initially
failing entities was taken as a set E ′ (|E ′| = K) such that — (a) The set E ′ constitutes
the K most vulnerable entities in the system, (b) Failing the entities in set E ′ would
cause failure of at least |E|/2 entities in total. The cardinality of the set E ′ along
with the total number of entities failed are enumerated in Table 4.4.
DataSet Num. Of Entities K Num. of Entities Killed
24 bus 58 8 29
30 bus 71 13 36
39 bus 84 17 42
57 bus 135 26 68
89 bus 295 78 147
118 bus 297 89 149
145 bus 567 191 284
300 bus 709 145 355
Region 1 48 6 26
Region 2 46 8 23
Region 3 48 6 24
Region 4 53 8 27
Table 4.4: Number of Entities, K Value Chosen and Number of Entities Failed
when the K Vulnerable Entities are Failed Initially for Different Data Sets
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In comparing the ILP and heuristic solution of the ENH problem we considered
5 distinct hardening budgets for each data set. With K being the number of initially
failing entities in a data set the hardening budgets were chosen between [1, K − 1]
(with value of K obtained from Table 4.4). It is also ensured that the hardening
budgets chosen had a high variance. Figures 4.1 - 4.12 shows the total number of
entities protected from failure for each data set using the ILP and heuristic solution.
The run-time performance of the solutions are provided in Table 4.5 (in the table ’Heu’
refers to the heuristic solution and Hi refers to the hardening budget corresponding to
the ith budget from left used in the bar graph plots). From Figures 4.1 - 4.12 it can be
seen that the heuristic performs almost similar to that of the ILP solution in terms of
quality. The maximum percent difference of the total number of entities protected in
the ILP when compared to the heuristic solution occurs for a hardening budget of 39
in the 145 bus system (Figure 4.7) with the percent difference being 3.1%. In terms
of run-time, heuristic outperforms the ILP with the heuristic computing solutions
nearly 200 times faster in larger systems (as seen for the 300 bus system in Table
4.5). Hence it can be reasonably argued that the heuristic produces fast near optimal
solutions for the ENH problem.
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Figure 4.1: Comparison of ILP Solution with Heuristic for 24 Bus System (ENH
Problem)
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Figure 4.2: Comparison of ILP Solution with Heuristic for 30 Bus System (ENH
Problem)
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Figure 4.3: Comparison of ILP Solution with Heuristic for 39 Bus System (ENH
Problem)
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Figure 4.4: Comparison of ILP Solution with Heuristic for 57 Bus System (ENH
Problem)
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Figure 4.5: Comparison of ILP Solution with Heuristic for 89 Bus System (ENH
Problem)
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Figure 4.6: Comparison of ILP Solution with Heuristic for 118 Bus System (ENH
Problem)
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Figure 4.7: Comparison of ILP Solution with Heuristic for 145 Bus System (ENH
Problem)
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Figure 4.8: Comparison of ILP Solution with Heuristic for 300 Bus System (ENH
Problem)
59
19  
  18
21  
  20
23  
  22
24  
  23
25  
  24
1 2 3 4 5
0
10
20
30
40
ILP solution
Heuristic
Figure 4.9: Comparison of ILP Solution with Heuristic for Region 1 (ENH Problem)
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Figure 4.10: Comparison of ILP Solution with Heuristic for Region 2 (ENH
Problem)
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Figure 4.11: Comparison of ILP Solution with Heuristic for Region 3 (ENH
Problem)
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Figure 4.12: Comparison of ILP Solution with Heuristic for Region 4 (ENH
Problem)
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Running time (in sec)
DataSet H1 H2 H3 H4 H5
ILP Heu ILP Heu ILP Heu ILP Heu ILP Heu
24 bus 0.45 0.01 0.25 0.01 0.72 0.01 0.23 0.01 0.21 0.01
30 bus 2.44 0.01 0.38 0.01 0.38 0.01 0.35 0.01 0.34 0.01
39 bus 0.80 0.01 0.50 0.01 0.49 0.01 0.48 0.01 0.47 0.01
57 bus 2.67 0.03 1.73 0.01 2.21 0.01 2.27 0.01 1.68 0.01
89 bus 23.2 0.05 14.6 0.03 14.6 0.03 14.5 0.03 14.7 0.75
118 bus 20.9 0.04 16.2 0.06 17.2 0.09 17.1 0.02 17.1 0.02
145 bus 85.2 0.05 71.0 0.10 71.3 0.18 68.4 0.06 78.3 0.07
300 bus 282 0.15 222 1.56 217 0.85 253 0.39 264 0.40
Region 1 0.53 0.01 0.36 0.01 0.34 0.01 0.36 0.01 0.36 0.01
Region 2 13.8 0.01 12.9 0.01 12.8 0.01 13.1 0.01 13.2 0.01
Region 3 1.92 0.01 1.36 0.01 1.29 0.01 1.31 0.01 1.44 0.01
Region 4 1.48 0.01 1.43 0.01 1.10 0.01 1.06 0.01 1.05 0.01
Table 4.5: Run Time Comparison of Integer Linear Program and Heuristic for
Different Data Sets (ENH Problem)
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Chapter 5
THE TARGETED ENTITY HARDENING PROBLEM
The Targeted Entity Hardening is a restricted version of the Entity Hardening Prob-
lem. For an intra-dependent power network or interdependent power and commu-
nication network, certain entities might have higher priority to be protected. There
might exist entities whose non-functionality poses higher economic or societal damage
as compared to other entities. For example, power and communication network enti-
ties corresponding to office buildings running global stock exchanges, the U.S. White
House, transportation sectors like airports etc. presumably are more important to
be protected. Let F denote the failed set of entities (including initial and induced
failure) when a set of K entities fail initially. We define a set P (with P ⊆ F ) of
entities which have a higher priority to be protected. The Targeted Entity Hardening
problem finds the minimum set of entities which when hardened would ensure that
none of the entities in set P fail.
5.1 Problem Formulation
Qualitatively, for a system I(E,F(E)) the objective of the Targeted Entity Hard-
ening problem is to choose a minimum cardinality set of entities to harden, with a
set of initially failing entities, such that all entities in a given set P are protected
from failure. We use the example with dependency equations outlined in Table 3.1 of
Chapter 3 to describe the Targeted Entity Hardening Problem with P = {b4}. With
{a2, a3} being the two entities failing initially, hardening entity a2 (with a3 failing)
would prevent failure of entities a1, a3, b1, b1, b3. Similarly, hardening the entity a3
(with a2 failing) would prevent the failure of entity b4. Even though hardening a2
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prevent failure of more entities than hardening a3, owing to the problem description
a3 has to be hardened which is a solution to the Targeted Entity Hardening problem
in this scenario. It is to be noted that other entities might also be protected from fail-
ure when a set of entities are hardened to protect a given set of entities. The Targeted
Entity Hardening problem is formally stated below accompanied with a descriptive
diagram provided in Figure 5.1 (in the figure direct failure means initial failure) —
The Targeted Entity Hardening (TEH) problem
INSTANCE: Given:
(i) A system I(E,F(E)), where the set E represent the set of entities, and F(E) is
the set of IDRs.
(ii) The set of K entities failing initially E ′, where E ′ ⊆ E.
(iii) The set F ⊆ E contains all the entities failed due to initial failure of E ′ entities
i.e. KillSet(E ′)
(iv) A positive integer k and k < K.
(v) A set P ⊆ F .
DECISION VERSION: Is there a set of entities H = E ′′ ⊆ E, |H| ≤ k, such that
hardening H entities would result in protecting all entities in the set P after entities
in E ′ fail at the initial time step.
OPTIMIZATION VERSION: Find the minimum set of entities in E to harden that
would result in protecting all entities in the set P after entities in E ′ fail at the initial
time step.
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Figure 5.1: Pictographic Description of the Targeted Entity Hardening Problem
5.2 Computational Complexity Analysis
In this subsection we prove the computational complexity of the Targeted Entity
Hardening Problem to be NP-complete in Theorem 7.
Theorem 7. The TEH problem is NP-complete
Proof. We proof that the Targeted Entity Hardening is NP complete by a reduction
from Set Cover problem. An instance of the Set Cover problem consists of (i) a set of
elements U = {x1, x2, . . . , xn}, (ii) a set of subsets S = {S1, S2, . . . , Sm} with Si ⊆ U
∀Si ∈ S, and (iii) a positive integer M . The problem asks the question whether there
is a subset S ′ of S with |S ′| ≤ M such that ⋃Sk∈S′ Sk = U . From an instance of the
Set Cover problem we create an instance of the Targeted Entity Hardening Problem
as follows. Consider a system I(E,F(E)) with E = A∪B, where A and B are entities
of two separate critical infrastructures dependent on each other. For each element xj
in U we add an entity aj in set A. Similarly for each subset Si in set S we add an
entity bi in set B. For each element xi ∈ U which appears in subsets Sm, Sn, Sp ∈ S
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(say) we add an IDR ai ← bm + bn + bp to F(E). There are no IDRs for entities in
set B which prevents any cascading failure. The value of K is set to |S| and E ′ = B
which fails all entities in A∪B. The set of P entities to be protected is set to A and
k is set to M .
Consider there exists a solution to the Set Cover problem. Then there exist a set
S ′ of cardinality M such that ⋃Sk∈S′ Sk = U . For each subsets Sk ∈ S ′ we harden
the entity bk ∈ B. So in each IDR of the A type entities there exist a B type entity
that is hardened. Hence all A type entities will be protected from failure thus solving
the Targeted Entity Hardening problem.
On the other way round consider there is a solution to the Targeted Entity Hard-
ening problem. This ensures either that for each entity aj ∈ A (i) aj itself is hardened,
or (ii) at least one entity from set B in aj’s IDR is hardened. For scenario (i) arbi-
trarily select an entity bp in aj’s IDR and include it in set C. For scenario (ii) include
the hardened entities in the IDR of aj into set C. This is done for each entity aj ∈ A.
For each entity in set C select the corresponding subset in set S. The union of these
set of subsets would result in the set U . Thus solving the set cover problem. Hence
the theorem is proved.
5.2.1 Restricted Case I: Problem Instance with One Minterm of Size One
This restriction imposed on the IDRs is the same as that of restricted case I of
the ENH problem. Using the definition of Protection set (as in Section 4.2.2) and the
result in Theorem 8 we design an algorithm (Algorithm 3) that solves the problem
for this restricted case optimally in polynomial time (proved in Theorem 9).
Theorem 8. Given a system I(E,F(E)) with IDRs of form restricted case I and
E ′ ⊂ E entities failing initially, for any entity ei and ej with ei 6= ej either (a)
PS(ei|E ′) ⊆ PS(ej|E ′), (b) PS(ej|E ′) ⊆ PS(ei|E ′), or (c) PS(ei|E ′) ∩ PS(ej|E ′) =
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∅.
Proof. Consider a directed graph G = (V,ED). The vertex set V consists of a vertex
for each entity in E. For each IDR of form y ← x there is a directed edge (x, y) ∈
ED. In this proof the term vertex and entity is used interchangeably as an entity is
essentially a vertex in G. It can be shown that G is either (a) Directed Acyclic Graph
(DAG) with maximum in-degree of at most 1 or, (b) contain at most one cycle with no
incoming edge to any vertex in the cycle and maximum in-degree of at most 1, or (c)
collection of graphs (a) and/or (b). Consider a vertex xi ∈ V . Let G′ = (V ′, E ′D) be
a subgraph of G with V ′ consisting of xi and all the vertices that has a directed path
from xi. Moreover, the edge set E
′
D consists of all edges (x, y) ∈ ED with x, y ∈ V ′
except for any edge (y, xi) with yi ∈ V ′. Such a subgraph G′ would be a directed
tree with (i) one or more entities in V ′\{xi} is in A′ ∪ B′. Let X denote the set of
such entities which satisfy this property, or (ii) no entities in V ′\{xi} is in E ′. If
the entity xi is hardened then for case (i) all the entities in V
′ would be protected
from failure except for entities in all subtrees with roots in X. The set of entities in
such subtrees are contained in a set Z (say). For this condition if ej ∈ V ′\Z then
PS(ej|E ′) ⊂ PS(ei|E ′). Else if ej ∈ Z then PS(xi|E ′) ∩ PS(ej|E ′) = ∅. For case
(ii) for any entity xj ∈ V ′ the condition PS(ej|E ′) ⊆ PS(Ei|E ′) always holds (the
equality holds for graphs of type (b) as stated above). This property holds for all
entities in the entity set E. Hence proved.
Theorem 9. Algorithm 3 solves the Targeted Entity Hardening problem with IDRs
having single minterms of size 1 optimally in polynomial time.
Proof. The Protection Sets of the entities can be found in a similar way as that
of computing Kill Sets defined in [18]. It can be shown that computing these
sets for all entities in E can be done in O(n3) where n = |E|. The while loop
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Algorithm 3: Algorithm for TEH problem with IDRs in form of Restricted
Case I
Data: A system I(E,F(E)), set E′ with |E′| = K entities failing initially and the
set P of entities to be protected from failure.
Result: A set of entities H to be hardened.
1 begin
2 For each entity ei ∈ (E) compute the Protection Sets PS(ei|E′) ;
3 Initialize H = ∅ ;
4 while P 6= ∅ do
5 Choose the Protection Set with highest |PS(ei|E′) ∩ P |;
6 Update H ← H ∪ {ei} ;
7 Update P ← P\PS(ei|E′);
8 for all dj ∈ E do
9 PS(ej |E′) = PS(ej |E′)\PS(ei|E′);
10 return H ;
in Algorithm 3 iterates for a maximum of n times. Step 5 can be computed in
O(n2) time. The for loop in step 8 iterates for n times. For any given ej and ei,
PS(ej|E ′) = PS(ej|E ′)\PS(ei|E ′) can be computed in O(n2) time with the worst
case being the condition when |PS(ei|E ′)| = |PS(ej|E ′)| = n. As step 9 is nested
in a for loop within the while loop this accounts for the most expensive step in the
algorithm. The time complexity of this step is O(n4). Thus Algorithm 3 runs poly-
nomially in n with time complexity being O(n4).
In Algorithm 3 the while loop iterates till all the entities in P are protected from
failure. In step 5 the entity ei with protection set PS(ei|E ′) having most number of
entities belonging to set P is chosen to be hardened. Correspondingly the entity ei
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is added to the hardening set H. The set P is updated by removing the entities in
PS(ei|E ′). Similarly all the protection sets are updated by removing the entities in
PS(ei|E ′).
We use the result from Theorem 8 to prove the optimality of Algorithm 3. An
entity ei is selected to be hardened at any iteration of the while loop has maximum
number of entities in PS(ei|E ′) ∩ P . All entities ej with PS(ej|E ′) ⊆ PS(ei|E ′)
would have PS(ej|E ′) ∩ P ⊆ PS(ei|E ′) ∩ P . Moreover there exist no entity ek for
which PS(ei|E ′) ⊂ PS(ek|E ′) otherwise ek would have been hardened instead. Hence
there exist no other entity that protect other entities in P including PS(ei|E ′) ∩ P .
So Algorithm 3 selects the minimum number of entities to harden that protects all
entities in P .
5.2.2 Restricted Case II: IDRs Having Arbitrary Number of Minterms of Size 1
For instance created in Theorem 7 the IDRs were logical disjunctions of minterms
with size 1. We consider this restriction to design an approximation algorithm for
the TEH problem and is shown in Theorem 10.
Theorem 10. The Targeted Entity Hardening Problem is O(log(|P |) approximate
when IDRs are logical disjunctions of minterms with size 1.
Proof. We first compute the protection set PS(ei|E ′) for all entities ei ∈ E. Each
protection set is pruned by removing entities that are not in set P . Now the Targeted
Entity Hardening Problem can be directly transformed into Minimum Set Cover prob-
lem by setting U = P and S = {PS(e1|E ′), PS(e2|E ′), ..., PS(x|E||E ′)}. Selecting
the corresponding entities of the protection sets that solve the Minimum Set Cover
problem would also solve the Targeted Entity Hardening problem. There exists an ap-
proximation ratio of order O(log(n)) (where n is the number of elements in set U) for
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the Set Cover problem. Therefore using the approximation algorithm that solves the
Set Cover problem, the same ratio holds for the Targeted Entity Hardening problem
with n = |P |. Hence proved.
5.3 Optimal and Heuristic Solution to the Problem
In this section an optimal ILP solution and a sub-optimal with polynomial time
complexity heuristic solution are described for the TEH problem.
5.3.1 Optimal solution using Integer Linear Program
The ILP formulation of the TEH problem is similar to that of ENH problem. The
only difference being there is no hardening budget in TEH problem and additionally
there is a set P ⊂ E of entities that should be protected from failure. We use the
same notations as of the ILP that solves the ENH problem. Using this the objective
of the TEH problem is formulated as follows:
min
( n∑
i=1
qxi
)
(5.1)
The constraint sets 2,3, and 4 of the ENH problem is employed in the TEH problem
as well along with an additional constraint set as described below:
Additional Constraint Set: For all entities ei,∈ P , xi(n−1) = 0. This ensures that all
the entities in set P are protected from failure at the final time step.
With these constraints, the objective in (5.1) minimizes the number of hardened
entities that results in protection of all entities in set P .
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5.3.2 Heuristic Solution
In this subsection we provide a greedy heuristic solution to the TEH problem. For
a given system I(E,F(E)) with set of entities as E ′(|E ′| = K) failing initially and
set of entities to protet being P , a heuristic is developed based on the following two
metrics — (a) Protection Set as defined in Section 4.2.2, (b) Prioritized Cumulative
Fractional Minterm Hit Value (PCFMHV).
Definition: The Prioritized Fractional Minterm Hit Value of an entity ej ∈ E in a
system I(E,F(E)) is denoted as FMHV (ej, X). It is calculated as PFMHV (ej, P ) =∑m
i=1
1
|si| . In the formulation m are the minterms in which ej appears over IDRs in
non operational entities in set P . The parameter si denotes i
th such minterm. If the
ej is hardened (or protected from failure) the value computed provides an estimate
future impact on protection of other non operational entities in set P .
Definition: The Prioritized Cumulative Fractional Minterm Hit Value of an en-
tity ej ∈ E is denoted as PCFMHV (ej). It is computed as PCFMHV (ej) =∑
∀xi∈PS(ej |E′) PFMHV (xi, PS(xi|E ′)). This gives a measure of future impact on
protecting non functional entities in P when the entity ej is hardened and entities
PS(ej|E ′) are protected from failure.
Using these definitions, the heuristic is formulated in Algorithm 4. For each
iteration of the while loop in the algorithm, the entity having highest cardinality of
the set PS(xi|A′ ∪ B′) ∩ P is hardened. This ensures that at each step the number
of entities protected in set P is maximized. In case of a tie, the entity having highest
Prioritized Cumulative Fractional Minterm Hit Value among the set of tied entities
is selected. This causes the selection of the entity that has the potential to protect
maximum number of entities in updated set P in subsequent iterations. Thus, the
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Algorithm 4: Heuristic solution to the TEH problem
Data: A system I(E,F(E)), set of K vulnerable entities and the set P of entities to
be protected from failure.
Result: A set of entities H to be hardened.
1 begin
2 Initialize D = ∅ and H = ∅ ;
3 Update F(E) as follows — (a) let Q be the set of entities that does not fail on
failing K entities, (b) remove IDRs corresponding to entities in set Q, (c)
update the minterm of remaining IDRs by removing entities in set Q;
4 while P 6= ∅ do
5 For each entity ei ∈ E\D compute PS(ei|E′) and PCFMHV (ei);
6 if There exists multiple entities having same value of highest cardinality of
the set PS(ei|E′) ∩ P then
7 Let ep be an entity having highest PCFMHV (ep) among all ep’s in the
set of entities having highest cardinality of the set PS(ei|A′ ∪B′);
8 If there is a tie choose arbitrarily;
9 Update H ← H ∪ {ep}, D ← D ∪ PS(ep|E′), P ← P\PS(ep|E′);
10 Update F(E) by removing entities in PS(ep|E′) both in the left and
right side of the IDRs ;
11 else
12 Let ei be an entity having highest cardinality of the set PS(ei|E′) ∩ P ;
13 Update H ← H ∪ {ep}, D ← D ∪ PS(ei|E′), P ← P\PS(ei|E′);
14 Update F(E) by removing entities in PS(ei|E′) both in the left and right
side of the IDRs ;
15 return H ;
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heuristic greedily minimizes the set of entities hardened which would cause protection
of all entities in P . The heuristic overestimates the cardinality of H from the optimal
solution. Algorithm 4 runs in polynomial time, more specifically the time complexity
is O(|P |n(n+m)2) (where n = |E| and m = Number of minterms in F(E)).
5.4 Experimental Result
To perform a comparative study of the heuristic with the ILP, we use the same data
sets as outlined in Chapter 4. Additionally, the initial failure set is computed using
K most vulnerable entities problem and the same value of K as in ENH problem are
chosen for each data set (as in Table 4.4). 5 distinct protection sets P were considered
for each data set. Let F denote the set entities failed in total when K entities fail
initially. The cardinality of the set F and the value of K was taken from Table 4.4 for
each data set. The cardinality of the protection set for a given data set was chosen
between [1, |F | − 1] ensuring that the chosen values have high variance. For a given
cardinality C the protection set P was constructed by choosing C entities from the set
F corresponding to a particular data set. Figures 5.2 - 5.13 shows the comparison of
the Heuristic solution with the ILP in terms of total number of entities hardened for
a given cardinality of protection budget. The run-time comparison of the solutions
are provided in Table 5.1. A maximum percent difference of 25% (ILP compared with
Heuristic) in the number of entities hardened can be seen in Region 2 for a |P | value of
13 (Figure 5.11). However, for most of the cases the heuristic produces near optimal
or optimal solution. The heuristic also compute the solutions nearly 200 times faster
than the ILP for larger systems as seen in Table 5.1. Hence it can be claimed that
the heuristic solution to the TEH problem produces near optimal solution at a much
faster time compared to the ILP solution.
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Figure 5.2: Comparison of ILP Solution with Heuristic for 24 Bus System (TEH
Problem)
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Figure 5.3: Comparison of ILP Solution with Heuristic for 30 Bus System (TEH
Problem)
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Heuristic
Figure 5.4: Comparison of ILP Solution with Heuristic for 39 Bus System (TEH
Problem)
Heuristic
Figure 5.5: Comparison of ILP Solution with Heuristic for 57 Bus System (TEH
Problem)
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Heuristic
Figure 5.6: Comparison of ILP Solution with Heuristic for 89 Bus System (TEH
Problem)
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Figure 5.7: Comparison of ILP Solution with Heuristic for 118 Bus System (TEH
Problem)
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Heuristic
Figure 5.8: Comparison of ILP Solution with Heuristic for 145 Bus System (TEH
Problem)
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Figure 5.9: Comparison of ILP Solution with Heuristic for 300 Bus System (TEH
Problem)
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Heuristic
Figure 5.10: Comparison of ILP Solution with Heuristic for Region 1 (TEH
Problem)
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Figure 5.11: Comparison of ILP Solution with Heuristic for Region 2 (TEH
Problem)
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Figure 5.12: Comparison of ILP Solution with Heuristic for Region 3 (TEH
Problem)
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Figure 5.13: Comparison of ILP Solution with Heuristic for Region 4 (TEH
Problem)
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Running time (in sec)
DataSet P1 P2 P3 P4 P5
ILP Heu ILP Heu ILP Heu ILP Heu ILP Heu
24 bus 0.42 0.01 0.22 0.01 0.20 0.01 0.19 0.01 0.19 0.01
30 bus 0.57 0.01 0.37 0.01 0.34 0.01 0.34 0.01 0.31 0.01
39 bus 0.82 0.01 0.49 0.01 0.49 0.01 0.46 0.01 0.47 0.01
57 bus 2.23 0.02 1.69 0.02 2.00 0.02 2.07 0.02 1.91 0.01
89 bus 17.3 0.05 14.4 0.08 14.4 0.16 14.0 0.11 14.1 0.07
118 bus 17.6 0.13 17.3 0.15 16.9 0.10 16.3 0.08 17.0 0.07
145 bus 79.0 0.06 76.6 0.26 77.2 0.27 75.7 0.24 74.9 0.25
300 bus 302 0.18 241 1.01 234 1.41 229 1.03 230 1.20
Region 1 0.55 0.01 0.40 0.01 0.43 0.01 0.35 0.01 0.34 0.01
Region 2 14.5 0.01 13.5 0.01 13.4 0.01 13.4 0.01 13.3 0.01
Region 3 1.58 0.01 1.40 0.01 1.29 0.01 1.29 0.01 1.29 0.01
Region 4 1.36 0.01 1.12 0.01 1.21 0.01 1.09 0.01 1.03 0.01
Table 5.1: Run Time Comparison of Integer Linear Program and Heuristic for
Different Data Sets (TEH Problem)
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Chapter 6
THE AUXILIARY ENTITY ALLOCATION PROBLEM
For a given set of entities failing initially, the system reliability can be increased
(i.e. entities can be protected from failure) by Entity Hardening. On scenarios where
entity hardening is not possible it is imperative to take alternative strategies. The
number of entities failing due to induced failure can be reduced by modifying the
IDRs. One way of modifying an IDR is adding an entity as a new minterm. For
example, consider the system I(E,F(E)) with IDRs given by Table 6.1. The cascade
propagation is hown in Table 6.2 when entities b2 and b3 fail initially. Let the IDR
b1 ← a2 be modified as b1 ← a2 + a5. Hence the new system is represented as
I(E,F ′(E)) with the same set of IDRs as that in Table 6.1 except for IDR b1 ← a2+a5
as the sole modification. The entity a1 introduced is termed as an auxiliary entity.
It follows that after the modification, failure of entities b2 and b3 at time t = 0 would
trigger failure of entities a2, a3 and a4 only. Thus before modification the failure
set would have been {a1, a2, a3, a4, b1, b2, b3} and after the modification it would be
{a2, a3, a4, b2, b3}. Thus the modification would lead to a fewer number of failures.
We make the following assumptions while modifying an IDR —
• It is possible to add an auxiliary entity as conjunction to a minterm. However it
is intuitive that this would have no impact in decreasing the number of entities
failed due to induced failure. Hence we modify an IDR by adding only one
auxiliary entity as a disjunction to a minterm
• An auxiliary entity does not have the capacity to make an entity operational
which fails due to initial failure. So to prune the search set for obtaining a
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Power Network Comm. Network
a1 ← b1 + b2 b1 ← a2
a2 ← b1b2 b2 ← a2
a3 ← b2 + b1b3 b3 ← a4
a4 ← b3 −−
a5 −−
Table 6.1: IDRs for the Constructed Example
Entities Time Steps (t)
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
a1 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1
a2 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
a3 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
a4 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
a5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
b1 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1
b2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
b3 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Table 6.2: Cascade Propagation when Entities {b2, b3} Fail Initially. 0 Denotes the
Entity is Operational and 1 Non-Operational
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solution we discard entities in the set of initially failing entities as possible
auxiliary entities.
• If an IDR D is modified then it is done by adding only one entity not in E ′∪ED
where E ′ is the set of initially failing entities and ED is a set consisting of all
entities (both on left and right side of the equation) in D. For any IDR D ∈ F(E
we denote AUX = E/(E ′∪ED) as the set of auxiliary entities that can be used
to modify D.
With these definitions the Auxiliary Entity Allocation Problem (AEAP) is de-
fined as follows. Let for a system I(E,F(E)), E ′ ⊂ E be the set of initially failing
entities. With a budget S in number of modifications, the task is to find which are
the S IDRs that are to be modified and which entity should be used to perform this
modification such that number of entities failing due to induced failure is minimized.
A more formal description given below.
The Auxiliary Entity Allocation Problem (AEAP)
Instance — A system I(E,F(E)), set of entities E ′ ⊂ E failing initially and two
positive integers S and Pf .
Decision Version — Does there exist S IDR auxiliary entity tuple (D, xi) such that
when each IDRs D ∈ F(E) is modified by adding auxiliary entity xi ∈ AUX as a
disjunction it would protect at least Pf entities from induced failure with entities in
set E ′ failing initially.
6.1 Computational Complexity Analysis
In this section we analyze the computational complexity AEAP. The computa-
tional complexity of the problem depends on nature of the IDRs. The problem is first
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solved by restricting the IDRs to have one minterm of size 1. For this special case
a polynomial time algorithm exists for the problem. With IDRs in general form the
problem is proved to be NP-complete.
6.1.1 Special Case: Problem Instance with One Minterm of Size One
The special case consist of IDRs which have a single minterm of size 1 and each
entity appearing exactly once on the right hand side of the IDR. AEAP can be solved
in polynomial time for this case. We first define Auxiliary Entity Protection Set and
use it to provide a polynomial time heuristic in Algorithm 5.
Definition: Auxiliary Entity Protection Set: With a given set of E ′ entities
failing initially the Auxiliary Entity Protection Set is defined as the number of entities
protected from induced failure when an auxiliary entity xi is added as a disjunction
to an IDR D ∈ F(E). It is denoted as AP (D, xi|E ′).
6.1.2 General Case: Problem Instance with an Arbitrary Number of Minterms of
Arbitrary Size
In Theorem 11 we prove that the decision version of AEAP for general case is NP
complete.
Theorem 11. The decision version of AEAP for Case IV is NP-complete.
Proof. The hardness is proved by a reduction from Set Cover problem. An instance
of a set cover problem consists of a universe U = {x1, x2, ..., xn} of elements and set
of subsets S = {S1, S2, ..., Sm} where each element Si ∈ S is a subset of U . Given an
integer X the set cover problem finds whether there are ≤ X elements in S whose
union is equal to U . From an instance of the set cover problem we create an instance
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Algorithm 5: Algorithm solving AEAP for IDRs with minterms of size 1
Data: A system I(E,F(E)) and set of E′ entities failing initially
Result: A set Dsol consisting of IDR auxiliary entity doubles (D,xi) (with
|Dsol| = S and Pf (denoting the entities protected from induced failure)
1 begin
2 For each IDR D ∈ F(E) and each entity xi ∈ AUX (where
AUX = E/(E′ ∪ ED)) compute the Auxiliary Entity Protection Set
AP (D,xi|E′) ;
3 Initialize Dsol = ∅ and Pf = ∅;
4 while S 6= 0 do
5 Choose the Auxiliary Entity Protection Set with highest AP (xi, D|E′). In
case of tie break arbitrarily. Let Dcur be the corresponding IDR and xcur
the auxiliary entity;
6 Update Dsol = Dsol ∪ (Dcur, xcur) and add auxiliary entity xcur as a
disjunction to the IDR Dcur ;
7 Update Pf = Pf ∪AP (Dcur, xcur|E′);
8 for ∀ IDR D′ ∈ F(E) and xi ∈ AUX of D′ do
9 Update AP (D′, xi|E′) = AP (D′, xi|E′)\AP (Dcur, xcur|E′);
10 S ← S − 1;
11 return Dsol and Pf ;
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of AEAP. Consider that the instance created refers to a system I(E,F(E)) where
E = A ∪ B (A and B containing entities of two separate infrastructures). For each
subset Si we create an entity bi and add it to set B. For each element xj in U
we add an entity aj to a set A1. We have a set A2 of entities where |A2| = |B|.
Let A2 = {a21, a22, ..., a2|B|} where there is an association between entity bj and a2j.
Additionally we have a set of entities A3 with |A3| = X which does not have any
dependency relation of its own. The set A is comprised of A1 ∪ A2 ∪ A3. The IDRs
are created as follows. For an element xi that appears in subsets Sx, Sy, Sz, an IDR
ai ← bx + by + bz is created. For each entity bj ∈ B an IDR bj ← a2j is added to
F(E). The cardinality of E ′ is set to |A2| and it directly follows that E ′ = A2. The
value of S (number of IDR modifications) is set to X and Pf is set to S + |A1|.
Let there exist a solution to the set cover problem. Then there exist at least X
subsets whose union covers the set U . For each subset Sk which is in the solution
of the set cover problem we choose the corresponding entity bk. Let B
′ be all such
entities. We arbitrarily choose and add an entity from A3 to each IDR bk ← a2k with
bk ∈ B′ to form S = X distinct IDR auxiliary entity doubles. As A3 type entities
does not have any dependency relation thus all the entities in B that correspond to
the subsets in the solution will be protected from failure. Additionally protecting
these B type entities would ensure all entities in A1 does not fail as well (as there
exists at least one B type entity in the IDR of A1 type entities which is operational).
Hence a total of X + |A1| are protected from failure.
Similarly let there exist a solution to AEAP. It can be checked easily that no
entities in B ∪A1 ∪A2 has the ability to protect additional entities using IDR modi-
fication. Hence set A3 can only be used as auxiliary entities. An entity from A3 for
the created instance can be added to an IDR of A1 type entity or B type entity. In
the former strategy only one entity is protected from failure whereas two entities are
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operational when we add auxiliary entity to IDRs of B type entities. Hence all the
auxiliary entities are added to the B type IDRs with a final protection of X + |A1|
entities. For each IDR of the B type entity to which the auxiliary entity is added,
the corresponding subset in S is chosen. The union of these subsets would result in
U as the solution of AEAP that protects the failure of all A1 type entities. Hence
solving the set cover problem and proving the hardness stated in theorem. 11.
6.2 Solutions to AEAP
We consider the following restricted case where there exists at least S entities in
the system I(E,F(E)) which does not belong to any of the failing entities. This
comprise the set of auxiliary entities that can be used. It is also imperative to use
such set as auxiliary entities because they never fail from induced or initial failure
when the entities in set E ′ fail initially. The problem still remains to be NP compete
for this case as in Theorem 11 the set of entities A3 belong to such class of auxiliary
entities. With these definition of the special case let A denote a set of such auxiliary
entities which can be used for IDR modifications with A ⊂ E/(E ′′) (where E ′′ are
the entities that fails due to failing entities E ′ initially). Hence we loose the notion of
IDR auxiliary entity doubles in the solution as any auxiliary entity from set A would
produce the same protection effect. Let A denote all such entities that can be used as
auxiliary entities as defined above. We additionally assume that |A| ≥ S, i.e., there
are enough auxiliary entities to suffice the AEAP budget S. So in both the solutions
we only consider the IDRs that needs to be modified and disregard which auxiliary
entity is used for this modification. We first propose an Integer Linear Program
(ILP) to obtain the optimal solution in this setting. We later provide a polynomial
heuristic solution to the problem. The performance of heuristic with respect to the
ILP is compared in the section to follow.
87
6.2.1 Optimal Solution to AEAP
We first define the variables used in formulating the ILP. A set of variables G =
{g1, g2, ..., gc} (with c = |E|) is used to maintain the solution of E ′ most vulnerable
entities. Any variable gi ∈ G is equal to 1 if ei ∈ E belongs to E ′ and is 0 otherwise.
For each entity ej a set of variables xjd are introduced with 0 ≤ d ≤ |E| − 1. xid is
set to 1 if the entity ei is non operational at time step d and is 0 otherwise. Let P
denote the total number of IDRs in the system and assume each IDR has a unique
label between numbers from 1 to P . A set of variables M = {m1,m2, ...,mP} are
introduced. The value of mi is set to 1 if an auxiliary node is added as a disjunction
to the IDR labeled i and 0 otherwise. With these definitions we define the objective
function and the set of constraints in the ILP.
min
( |E|∑
i=1
xi(|E|−1)
)
(6.1)
The objective function defined in 6.1 tries to minimize the number of entities having
value 1 at the end of the cascade i.e. time step |E| − 1. Explicitly this objective
minimizes the number of entities failed due to induced failure. The constraints that
are imposed on these objective to capture the definition of AEAP are listed below —
Constraint Set 1: xi0 ≥ gi. This imposes the criteria that if entity ei belongs to E ′
then the corresponding variable xi0 is set to 1 capturing the initial failure.
Constraint Set 2: xid ≥ xi(d−1),∀d, 1 ≤ d ≤ |E| − 1. This ensures that the vari-
able corresponding to an entity which fails at time step t would have value 1 for all
d ≥ t.
Constraint Set 3: We use the theory developed in [18] to generate constraints to
represent the cascade through the set of IDRs. To describe this consider an IDR
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ai ← bjbpbl + bmbn + bq in the system. Assuming the IDR is labeled v it is reformu-
lated as ai ← bjbpbl + bmbn + bq + mv with mv ∈ M . This is done for all IDRs. The
constraint formulation is described in the following steps.
Step 1: All minterms of size greater than 1 are replaced with a single virtual entity. In
this example we introduce two virtual entities C1 and C2 (C1, C2 /∈ A∪B) capturing
the IDRs C1 ← bjbpbl and C2 ← bmbn. The IDR in the example can be then trans-
formed as ai ← C1 + C2 + bq + mv. For any such virtual entity Ck a set of variables
ckd are added with ckd = 1 if Ck is alive at time step d and 0 otherwise. Hence all the
IDRs are represented as disjunction(s) of single entities. Similarly all virtual entities
have IDRs which are conjunction of single entities.
Step 2: For a given virtual entity Ck and all entities having a single midterm of
arbitrary size, we add constraints to capture the cascade propagation. Let N denote
the number of entities in the IDR of Ck. The constraints added is described through
the example stated above. The variable c1 with IDR C1 ← bjbpbl, constraints c1d ≥
yj(d−1)+yp(d−1)+yl(d−1)
N
and c1d ≤ yj(d−1) + yp(d−1) + yl(d−1)∀d, 1 ≤ d ≤ |E| − 1 are added
(with N = 3 in this case). This ensures that if any entity in the conjunction fails the
corresponding virtual entity fails as well.
Step 3: In the transformed IDRs described in step 1 let n denote the number of entities
in disjunction for any given IDR (without modification). In the given example with
IDR ai ← C1 +C2 +bq+mv, constraints of form xid ≥ c1(d−1) +c2(d−1) +yq(d−1) +mv−
(n− 1) and xid ≤ c1(d−1)+c2(d−1)+yq(d−1)+mvn ∀d, 1 ≤ d ≤ |E| − 1 are added. This ensures
that the entity ai will fail only if all the entities in disjunction become non operational.
Constraint Set 4: To ensure that only S auxiliary entities are added as disjunction
to the IDRs constraint
∑P
v=1mv ≤ S is introduced.
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6.2.2 Heuristic solution to AEAP
In this section we provide a polynomial heuristic solution to AEAP. We first
redenote Auxiliary Entity Protection Set as AP (D|E ′) as it is immaterial which entity
is added as an auxiliary entity since no auxiliary entity can fail due to any kind
of failure. Along with the definition of Auxiliary Entity Protection Set, we define
Auxiliary Cumulative Fractional Minterm Hit Value (ACFMHV) for designing the
the heuristic. We first define Auxiliary Fractional Minterm Hit Value (AFMHV)
which is used in defining ACFMHV.
Definition: The Auxiliary Fractional Minterm Hit Value of an IDR Dj ∈ F(E)
is denoted by AFMHV (Dj|E ′). It is calculated as AFMHV (Dj|E ′) =
∑m
i=1
1
|si| .
Let xj denote the entity in the right hand side of the IDR Dj. m denotes all the
minterms in which the entity xj appears over all IDRs. The parameter si denotes i
th
such minterm with |si| being its size. If an auxiliary entity is placed at D then the
value computed above provides an estimate implicit impact on protection of other
non operational entities.
Definition: The Auxiliary Cumulative Fractional Minterm Hit Value of an IDR
Dj ∈ F(E) is denoted by ACFMHV (Dj). It is computed as ACFMHV (Dj) =∑
∀xi∈AP (D|E′)AFMHV (Dxi |E ′) where Dxi is the IDR for entity xi ∈ AP (D|E ′).
The impact produced by the protected entities when IDR D is allocated with an
auxiliary entity over set A ∪B is implicitly provided by this definition.
The heuristic is provided in Algorithm 6. At any given iteration the auxiliary
entity is placed at the IDR which protects the most number of entities from failure.
In case of a tie the entity having highest ACFMHV value is chosen. At any given iter-
ation the algorithm greedily maximize the number of entities protected from induced
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Algorithm 6: Heuristic solution to AEAP
Data: A system I(E,F(E)), set of E′ entities failing initially, set A of auxiliary
entities and budget S
1 . Result: Sets Dsol and Pf
2 begin
3 Initialize Dsol = ∅ and Pf = ∅;
4 while S 6= 0 do
5 For each IDR D ∈ F(E) compute the AP (D|E′) ;
6 if Multiple IDRs have same highest cardinality AP (D|E′) then
7 For each IDR D ∈ F(E) compute ACFMHV (D) ;
8 Let Dp be an IDR having highest ACFMHV (Dp) among all Di’s in the
set of IDRs having highest cardinality of the set AP (Di|E′);
9 Update Dsol = Dsol ∪Dp and add an auxiliary entity from A as a
disjunction to the IDR Dp;
10 Update Pf = Pf ∪AP (Dp), S ← S − 1 and A by removing the auxiliary
entity added ;
11 else
12 Let Dp be an IDR having highest cardinality of the set D ∈ F(E);
13 Update Dsol = Dsol ∪Dp and add an auxiliary entity from A as a
disjunction to the IDR Dp;
14 Update Pf = Pf ∪AP (Dp|E′), S ← S − 1 and A by removing the
auxilary entity added ;
15 Prune the system I(E,F(E)) by removing the IDRs for entities in
AP (Dp|E′) and removing the same set of entities from E ;
16 return Dsol and Pf ;
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failure. Algorithm 6 runs in polynomial time, more specifically the time complexity
is O(Sn(n+m)2) (where n = |E| and m = Number of minterms in F(E)).
6.3 Experimental Results
To perform a comparative study of the heuristic with the ILP, we use the same data
sets as outlined in Chapter 4. Additionally, the initial failure set is computed using
K most vulnerable entities problem and the same value of K as in ENH problem
are chosen for each data set (as in Table 4.4). 5 distinct allocation budgets were
considered for each data set. The allocation budget for a given data set was chosen
between [1, 17]. The set A containing auxiliary entities are chosen from the set of
operational entities for a given data set. Figures 6.1 - 6.12 shows the comparison of
the Heuristic solution with the ILP in terms of total number of entities protected for
a given allocation budget. The run-time comparison of the solutions are provided in
Table 6.3. A maximum percent difference of 13% (ILP compared with Heuristic) in
the number of entities protected can be seen for 89 bus system when allocation budget
is 1 (Figure 6.5). However, for most of the cases the heuristic produces near optimal
or optimal solution. The heuristic also compute the solutions nearly 200 times faster
than the ILP for larger systems as seen in Table 5.1. Hence it can be claimed that
the heuristic solution to AEAP produces near optimal solution at a much faster time
compared to the ILP solution.
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Figure 6.1: Comparison of ILP Solution with Heuristic for 24 Bus System (AEAP
Problem)
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Figure 6.2: Comparison of ILP Solution with Heuristic for 30 Bus System
(Auxiliary Entity Allocation Problem Problem)
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Figure 6.3: Comparison of ILP Solution with Heuristic for 39 Bus System
(Auxiliary Entity Allocation Problem)
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Figure 6.4: Comparison of ILP Solution with Heuristic for 57 Bus System
(Auxiliary Entity Allocation Problem)
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Figure 6.5: Comparison of ILP Solution with Heuristic for 89 Bus System
(Auxiliary Entity Allocation Problem)
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Figure 6.6: Comparison of ILP Solution with Heuristic for 118 Bus System
(Auxiliary Entity Allocation Problem)
95
23    23
60  
  56
72  
  68
80  
  76
84  
  80
1 5 9 13 17
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
ILP solution
Heuristic
Figure 6.7: Comparison of ILP Solution with Heuristic for 145 Bus System
(Auxiliary Entity Allocation Problem)
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Figure 6.8: Comparison of ILP Solution with Heuristic for 300 Bus System
(Auxiliary Entity Allocation Problem)
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Figure 6.9: Comparison of ILP Solution with Heuristic for Region 1 (Auxiliary
Entity Allocation Problem)
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Figure 6.10: Comparison of ILP Solution with Heuristic for Region 2 (Auxiliary
Entity Allocation Problem)
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Figure 6.11: Comparison of ILP Solution with Heuristic for Region 3 (Auxiliary
Entity Allocation Problem)
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Figure 6.12: Comparison of ILP Solution with Heuristic for Region 4 (Auxiliary
Entity Allocation Problem)
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Running time (in sec)
DataSet P1 P2 P3 P4 P5
ILP Heu ILP Heu ILP Heu ILP Heu ILP Heu
24 bus 0.49 0.01 0.20 0.01 0.20 0.01 0.21 0.01 0.18 0.01
30 bus 0.69 0.01 0.35 0.01 0.37 0.01 0.35 0.01 0.36 0.01
39 bus 0.9 0.01 0.49 0.01 0.46 0.01 0.45 0.01 0.46 0.01
57 bus 2.07 0.01 1.62 0.12 1.58 0.01 2.85 0.01 2.02 0.01
89 bus 16.5 0.06 14.6 0.03 14.8 0.03 14.1 0.02 14.9 0.02
118 bus 17.2 0.02 16.2 0.04 17.0 0.05 16.3 0.03 16.6 0.02
145 bus 79.1 0.03 76.7 0.06 76.9 0.05 76.3 0.03 76.2 0.04
300 bus 240 0.11 233 0.40 232 0.46 233 0.27 231 0.30
Region 1 0.57 0.01 0.35 0.01 0.34 0.01 0.34 0.01 0.35 0.01
Region 2 13.6 0.01 12.8 0.01 12.9 0.01 12.8 0.01 12.8 0.01
Region 3 1.50 0.01 1.29 0.01 1.24 0.01 1.37 0.01 1.27 0.01
Region 4 1.28 0.01 1.09 0.01 1.03 0.01 1.05 0.01 1.07 0.01
Table 6.3: Run Time Comparison of Integer Linear Program and Heuristic for
Different Data Sets (Auxiliary Entity Allocation Problem)
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Chapter 7
THE ROBUSTNESS PROBLEM
This chapter addresses a new metric for Robustness. We utilize IIM to model the de-
pendencies and consider two type of dependencies while performing our experimental
analysis — (a) interdependent power-communication network, (b) intra-dependent
power network. It is critical to understand which set of entities which when failed
initially would pose damage beyond a certain threshold. This understanding would
provide the operator to employ proper protocols to prevent wide-scale failures. Using
this motivation the chapter defines and provide solutions to compute Robustness. In
IIM both the case (a) and (b) types of dependencies / inter-dependencies is gener-
ically represented as I(E,F(E)), where E are the set of entities and F(E) are the
set of dependency relations portraying the dependencies in the infrastructure(s). The
metric computing the Robustness is defined by using two parameters K ∈ I+ ∪ {0}
and ρ ∈ R with 0 < ρ ≤ 1. If a minimum of K + 1 entities need to fail for a failure
of at least ρ(|E|) entities then the system is (K, ρ)-robust. Utilization of this metric
has the following advantages (a) For a new deployment of entities in an infrastruc-
ture, this metric provides the equipment installation personnel with information to
make the system less vulnerable to initial failure triggers caused by human or nature,
(b) For existing infrastructures the operator can use the metric to identify critical
sections of the system based upon the extent of failure that section would cause.
7.1 Problem Formulation
We define a new metric for computing Robustness of a system I(E,F(E)). For
a given system the metric is denoted by (K, ρ) where K ∈ I+ ∪ {0} is an integer and
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ρ ∈ R is a real valued paramter with 0 < ρ ≤ 1. A system I(E,F(E)) is (K, ρ)
robust if a minimum of K+1 entities need to fail initially for a final failure of at least
ρ|E| entities.
Power Network Comm. Network
a1 ← b2 b1 ← a1a2
a2 ← b1 + b2 b2 ← a1 + a3a4
a3 ← b2b3 b3 ← a2a3
a4 ← b1b3 + b4 b4 ← a1
Table 7.1: IDRs for the Constructed Example
Entities Time Steps (t)
0 1 2 3 4 5 6
a1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
a2 0 0 0 0 1 1 1
a3 0 0 0 0 1 1 1
a4 0 0 1 1 1 1 1
b1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1
b2 0 0 0 1 1 1 1
b3 0 0 0 0 0 1 1
b4 0 1 1 1 1 1 1
Table 7.2: Failure Cascade Propagation when Entity {a1} Fail at Time Step t = 0.
A Value of 1 Denotes Entity Failure, and 0 Otherwise
Consider the system described in Table 7.1. It can be seen in Table 7.2 that the
initial failure of the entity a1 causes all the entities to fail in the steady state. Hence,
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a minimum of 1 entity needs to fail for failure of any number of entities ranging
from 1 to 8 in the system. So for any ρ value the system is (0,ρ) robust. With this
definition the primary challenge is to compute this robustness metric of a system.
In our approach we take as input a system I(E,F(E)) and ρ with 0 < ρ ≤ 1 and
compute the minimum number of entities (say K ′) require to fail at t = 0 that would
cause a failure of at least ρ|E| entities in total. With K ′ = K − 1 we then term the
system as (K, ρ) robust. We term this as the Robustness Computation (RC) problem.
A formal description of the decision and optimization version of the RC problem is
stated below —
The Robustness Computation (RC) problem
Instance— A system I(E,F(E)), an integer K ∈ I+ and a real valued parameter
ρ ∈ R with 0 < ρ ≤ 1.
Decision Version— Does there exist a set of entities SI ⊆ E and |SI | ≤ K which
when failed initially causes a final failure of at least ρ|E|) entities.
Optimization Version— Find the minimum set of entities (say K ′) which when
fail initially would cause a total final failure of at least ρ|E| entities. The system
would then be (K ′ − 1, ρ) robust.
It is to be noted that the decision version is developed as a negation to the RC
problem i.e. a solution would ensure that the underlying system is not (K, ρ) robust.
To find the solution to the RC problem the negation to the RC problem has to iterated
from K = |E|−1 to 0. Consider K = K ′ as the first integer in the iteration for which
there is a no answer to the negation of the RC problem. Then the robustness of
the system is (K ′, ρ). So using a polynomial number of computation on the method
computing the negation of the RC problem, the RC problem can be solved. Hence,
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the negation of the RC problem can be used to analyze the computational complexity
of the RC problem.
7.2 Computational Complexity Analysis
The computational complexity analysis of the RC problem is described in this
section. As noted earlier that analyzing computational complexity to the negation
of the RC problem is same that of the RC problem. We denote the negation to RC
problem as RC. We prove that the decision version of the RC problem is NP-complete
in Theorem 12. Additionally we analyze two sub-cases by imposing restrictions on
the IDRs. In the first restricted case we provide a polynomial time solution to the RC
problem. For the second restricted case we prove the RC problem to be NP-complete
under the restriction and use the result to derive an in-approximability bound on the
problem.
Theorem 12. The decision version of the RC problem is NP-complete.
Proof. We prove the NP-completeness by giving a transformation from the Hitting
Set Problem. An instance of the hitting set problem consists of a set of elements S
and a set S = {S1, S2, S3, .., Sn} where Si ⊆ S, ∀Si ∈ S. The question asked in the
problem is given an integer M does there exist a set S ′ ⊆ S with |S ′| ≤ M such
that each subset in S contains at least one element from S ′. From an instance of the
hitting set problem we create an instance of the RC problem as follows. Consider a
system I(E,F(E)) with E = A ∪B. For each element xi ∈ S we add an entity bi to
set B. Similarly for each subset Si ∈ S we add an entity ai to set A. For each subset
Si = {xm, xn, xp} (say) we create an IDR ai ← bmbnbp. The value of K is set to M
and ρ is set to M+|S||S|+|S| . It is to be noted that there wont be any cascading failure due
to absence of dependency relations of B type entities.
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Let there exists a solution to the hitting set problem. So each subset Si ∈ S has
at least one element from set S ′ (with |S ′| = M). Hence killing the corresponding B
type entities from the constructed instance would kill all A type entities. Thus the
fraction of entities killed is M+|S||S|+|S| = ρ solving the RC problem.
On the other way round let there exist a solution to the RC problem. It can be
shown that the initial failure set would always be chosen from set B to fail ρ = M+|S||S|+|S|
fraction of entities. This is because failure of any A type entity cannot trigger failure
of any other entity. Moreover the total number of entities in final failure set is M+ |S|
(as |S| = |A|). Thus the failure set must contain all A type entities except for M other
entities which has to be chosen from set B. So a solution to RC problem consisting
of entities B′ ⊆ B would ensure that for each entity ai ∈ A at least one entity in its
IDR is killed initially. So the set of elements in S ′ corresponding to the entities in B′
would solve the hitting set problem. Hence proved
7.2.1 Restricted Case I: Problem Instance with One Minterm of Size One
The IDRs in the set F(E) have minterms of size 1. With two entities ei and ej
the IDR ei ← ej represents this case. Additionally any entity can appear at most
once on the left side of the IDR. We provide a polynomial time algorithm (Algorithm
7) and prove its optimality ( Theorem 13) that solves the RC problem for Case I.
To develop the algorithm we use the definition of Kill Set of an entity ei ∈ E (as
defined in Section 4.1). Using the concept of Kill Set Algorithm 7 is developed. For
a given value of ρ the algorithm returns a set of entity R which when killed initially
would cause failure of at least ρ|E| entities. Theorem 13 proves that the set R re-
turned has the minimum possible cardinality for a given value of ρ. Thus the system
is (|R| − 1, ρ) robust.
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Algorithm 7: Algorithm solving RC problem optimaly for IDRs with Restricted
Case I type dependencies
Data: A system I(E,F(E)) and a real valued parameter ρ ∈ (0, 1].
Result: A set of entities R in I(E,F(E)).
1 begin
2 For each entity ei ∈ (E) compute the set of kill sets C = {Ce1 , Ce2 , ..., Ce|E|},
where Cei = KillSet(ei) ;
3 Initialize D ← ∅ and E ← ∅ ;
4 while |D| < ρ(|E|) do
5 Let ej be the entity having highest |Cej |, in case of a tie choose arbitrarily ;
6 Update R← R ∪ {ej};
7 Update D ← D ∪ Cej ;
8 for (i = 1; i ≤ |E|; i+ +) do
9 Cei ← Cei\Cej ;
10 return E ;
Theorem 13. Algorithm 7 solves the RC problem for Restricted Case I optimally in
polynomial time.
Proof. Computation of Kill Sets for all E entities can be done in O((|E|)3) [18]. The
while loop runs for maximum of |E| times when ρ = 1 and Kill Set of each entity
is only composed of the entity itself. The highest cardinality Kill Set among all Kill
Sets can be found in O(|E|). The for loop iterates for |E| times with computation
inside it taking O(|E|) time per iteration. Hence, the time complexity of the while
loop in total is O((|E|)3). So the overall time complexity of Algorithm 7 is O((|E|)3).
We claim that Algorithm 7 returns the optimal value of robustness parameter
K = |R| − 1 of an IDN I(E,F(E)) with set R containing the minimum number
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of entities that causes failure of at least ρ(|E|) entities. The claim is proved by
contradiction. Let ROPT be the optimal set that causes failure of at least ρ(|E|)
entities and en be an entity in ROPT\R. It is proved in [18] that in this restricted
case for any two entities ei and ej, Cei ∩Cej = ∅ or Cei ∩Cej = Cei or Cei ∩Cej = Cej
where ei 6= ej. At any iteration of the while loop the entity ej with highest cardinality
Kill Set is selected. Inside the for loop all entities having Cei ∩ Cej = Cei and the
entity itself would have its Kill Set updated to ∅. Hence the Kill Set of the entity
xn would either be set to ∅ at some iteration of the while loop or didn’t have the
highest cardinality at any iteration. Hence adding en to optimal solution would have
made no difference or reduce the number of failed entities. Hence a contradiction. So,
Algorithm 7 returns the minimum number of entities that causes failure of at least
ρ(|E|) entities.
7.2.2 Restricted Case II: Problem Instance with an Arbitrary Number of Minterms
of Size One
This restricted case is composed of IDRs having arbitrary number of minterms of
size 1. The IDRs of this case can be represented as ei ←
∑p
q=1 eq. The given example
has p minterms each of size 1. Thus to kill ei, all entities in its IDR must be non-
operational. In Theorem 14 we prove that the decision version of the RC problem
for this restricted case is NP complete. Using the instance creation as described in
Theorem 14 and the NP-completeness proff we provide an in-approximability bound
on the RC problem in Theorem 15.
Theorem 14. The decision version of the RC problem for Case III is NP-complete.
Proof. We prove that the problem is NP-complete by giving a reduction from the
Densest p-Subhypergraph problem [32], a known NP- complete problem. An instance
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of the Densest p-Subhypergraph problem includes a hypergraph G = (V,EV ), a pa-
rameter p and a parameter M . The problem asks the question whether there exists
a set of vertices |V ′| ⊆ V and |V ′| ≤ p such that the subgraph induced with this
set of vertices has at least M completely covered hyperedges. From an instance of
the Densest p-Subhypergraph problem we create an instance of the RC problem as
follows. Consider a system I(E,F(E)) with E = A ∪ B. For each vertex vi ∈ V
we add an entity bi to set B. Similarly, for each hyperedge ej ∈ E we add an en-
tity aj to set A. For each hyperedge ej with ej = {vm, vn, vq} (say) an IDR of form
aj ← bm + bn + bq is created and added to F(E). The value of K is set to p and ρ
is set to p+M|V |+|EV | . It is to be noted that there wont be any cascading failure due to
absence of dependency relations of B type entities.
Let there exist a solution to the Densest p-Subhypergraph problem. Then there
exist a set V ′ ⊆ V and |V ′| = p that covers completely at least M hypedges in EV .
Thus killing the B type entities corresponding to the vertices in V ′ would cause at
least M A type entities to fail. Hence the fraction of entities killed is ≥ p+M|V |+|EV | = ρ.
So the solution of the Densest p-Subhypergraph problem solves the RC problem.
For the created instance of the RC problem all entities in set B can only fail
initially. The A type entities can either fail initially or through induced failure of
failing B type entities. Hence initial failure of entities from set B would have the
most impact on final number of entities failed. Let us assume that there exists one
or many solutions to the RC problem. Then at least one solution would have entities
only from set B. For this solution the number of entities killed on initial failure of p B
type entities is at least p+M . The additional M entities killed belongs to set A. So
the vertices in V corresponding to the entities in B would completely cover at least M
hyperedges. Thus the solution of RC problem solves the Densest p-Subhypergraph
problem. Hence proved.
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Theorem 15. The RC problem is hard to approximate within a factor 1
2log(n)
λ (where
n = |E|) for some λ > 0.
Proof. In [32] it is proved the Densest p-Subhypergraph problem is hard to approxi-
mate within a factor of 1
2log(n)
λ with λ > 0. For IDRs of form in this restricted case
it is shown in Theorem 14 that Densest p-Subhypergraph problem is a special case
of the RC problem. So this in-approximability bound holds for the RC problem as
well. Hence proved.
7.3 Solutions to the RC Problem
Owing to the problem being NP-complete we first propose an Integer Linear pro-
gram (ILP) that solves the problem optimally. Since, the run time of the ILP becomes
exponential with input size so a sub-optimal heuristic that runs in polynomial time
is also proposed in this section.
7.3.1 Optimal Solution for the RC problem
For a given parameter ρ ∈ (0, 1] and a system I(E,F(E)), we formulate an ILP
that computes the minimum number of entities which need to fail at t = 0 for a final
failure of ρ(|E|) entities. Let K ′ denote the solution to the ILP. The system is then
(K, ρ) robust with K = K ′ − 1. For each entity where ei ∈ E a set of variables xid
(0 ≤ d ≤ |E| − 1) are created in the ILP. d is the parameter which denotes the time
step. If xid =1 then the entity ei is non-operational at time setp d and operational if
xid = 0. state. Using these variable creations the objective of the ILP is provided in
Equation 7.1
min
|E|∑
i=1
xi0 (7.1)
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The constraints of the ILP are formally described as follows:
Constraint Set 1: xid ≥ xi(d−1),∀d, 1 ≤ d ≤ |E| − 1 The constraint ensures that if an
entity ei fails at time step d, it should remain in a state of failure for all subsequent
time steps.
Constraint Set 2: Consider an IDR of form ei ← ej+ekel+emeneq. A set of constraints
is developed for each such IDR that captures the cascading failure process. The set
of constraints are described below —
Step 1: We bring in new variables to denote minterms of size greater than one. In
this example, two new variables c1 and c2 are introduced to represent the minterms
ekel and emeneq respectively. This is equivalent of adding two new IDRs c1 ← ekel
and c2 ← emeneq with the transformed IDR being ei ← ej + c1 + c2.
Step 2: For each IDR corresponding to the c type variables, we establish a linear
constraint to capture the failure propagation. For an IDR c2 ← emeneq the constraint
is represented as c2d ≤ xm(d−1) + xn(d−1) + xq(d−1), ∀d, 1 ≤ d ≤ |E| − 1.
Step 3: Similarly, for each transformed IDR, we introduce a linear constraint to cap-
ture the failure propagation. For an IDR ei ← ej+c1+c2 the constraint is represented
as N × xid ≤ xj(d−1) + c1(d−1) + c2(d−1),∀d, 1 ≤ d ≤ |E| − 1. Here N is the number of
minterms in the IDR (in this example N = 3).
Constraint Set 3: It must also be satisfied that at time step |E| − 1, at least ρ(|E|)
entities fail in total. This can be captured by introducing the constraint
m∑
i=1
ei(tf ) ≥
ρ(|A|+ |B|).
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With the objective in (7.1) and set of constraints, the ILP finds the minimum
number of entities K ′ which when failed initially, causes at least ρ(|E|) entities to fail
in total at t = |E| − 1. Thus using this solution the system is (K ′ − 1, ρ) robust.
7.3.2 Heuristic Solution for the RC problem
A sub-optimal heuristic solution to the RC problem is proposed in this section.
The heuristic utilizes the definition of Kill Set (as defined in Section 4.1) and Cu-
mulative Fractional Minterm Hit Value of an entity (defined below). Using these
definitions the heuristic is provided in Algorithm 8.
Definition: Fractional Minterm Hit Value: For an entity ej ∈ E in a dependent
system I(E,F(E)) the Fractional Minterm Hit Value is denoted as FMHV (ej, X).
It is calculated as FMHV (ej, X) =
∑m
i=1
1
|si| . In the formulation m are the minterms
in which ej appears over all IDRs except for entities in set X. The parameter si
denotes ith such minterm. If the entity ej is killed then the computed value provides
an estimate of the future impact on killing of other operational entities.
Definition: Cumulative Fractional Minterm Hit Value: The Cumulative Fractional
Minterm Hit Value of an entity ej ∈ E is denoted as CFMHV (ej). It is computed as
CFMHV (ej) =
∑
∀ei∈KS(ej) FMHV (ej, KS(ej)). This gives a measure of the future
impact on killing functional entities when the entity ej is killed.
In Algorithm 8, for each iteration of the while loop the operational entity having
highest cardinality Kill Set is selected. This ensures that at each step the number
of entities failed is maximized. In case of a tie, the entity having highest cardinality
Cumulative Fractional Minterm Hit Value among the set of tied entities is selected.
This causes the selection of the entity that has the potential to kill maximum number
of entities in the subsequent steps. Thus, the heuristic greedily minimizes the set of
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Algorithm 8: Heuristic Solution to RC problem
Data: A system I(E,F(E)) and a real valued parameter ρ ∈ (0, 1].
Result: An integer |KH | − 1 where KH is a set of entities that when killed initially
fails at least ρ(|E|) entities
1 begin
2 Initialize D ← ∅ and KH ← ∅ ;
3 while |D| < ρ(|E|) do
4 For each entity ei ∈ E\D compute the kill set Cei ;
5 For each entity ei ∈ E\D compute CFMHV (ei);
6 Let ej be the entity having highest |Cej | ;
7 if There exists multiple entities having highest cardinality Kill Set then
8 Let ep be an entity having highest CFMHV (ep) with ep in the set of
entities having highest cardinality Kill Set;
9 If there is a tie choose arbitrarily;
10 Update KH ← KH ∪ {ep} ;
11 Update D ← D ∪ Cep ;
12 Update all dependencies in F(E) by removing entities in the left and
right side of the IDRs that belong to Cep ;
13 else
14 Update KH ← KH ∪ {ej} ;
15 Update D ← D ∪ Cxj ;
16 Update all dependencies in F(E) by removing entities in the left and
right side of the IDRs that belong to Cep ;
17 return |KH | − 1 ;
entities which when killed initially fails at least ρ fraction of total entities in the IDN.
The heuristic overestimates the parameter K while determining the robustness (K, ρ)
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of an IDN. The value of the parameter K is equal to |KH | − 1 which is the output of
Algorithm 8. Algorithm 8 runs in polynomial time, more specifically the run time is
ρn(n+m)2 (where n = |E| and m = Number of minterms in F(E)).
7.3.3 Comparative Study of the ILP and Heuristic for the Problems
We perform a comparative study of the ILP with the heuristic for the RC prob-
lem using the same data sets as used in ENH problem (Chapter 4). We com-
pared the heuristic solution with the ILP by considering 5 different values of ρ =
{0.1, 0.3, 0.5, 0.7, 0.9}. Table 7.3 compares the quality of the solution for different
values of ρ and data sets. The quality of the solution is measured as the K value of
the robustness metric returned for the corresponding value of ρ. The run time perfor-
mance of the solutions are enumerated in Table 7.4. For a ρ value of 0.7 in Region 2
it can be seen that the K value in heuristic is 50% of the optimal. This is maximum
percent difference in the quality of the solution across all the experiments. However, it
can be seen that for most of the cases the heuristic performs very close to the optimal
solution produced by the ILP. Moreover, from Table 7.4 it can be inferred that the
heuristic solves the RC problem much faster than the ILP with heuristic performing
nearly 100 times faster for systems having large number of entities. Hence, using this
results in can be reasonably argued that the heuristic solution provides near optimal
solution in much lesser computation and hence can be used to solve the RC problem.
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ρ and Robustness Values
DataSet 0.1 0.3 0.5 0.7 0.9
ILP Heu ILP Heu ILP Heu ILP Heu ILP Heu
24 bus 2 2 6 6 15 15 27 27 39 39
30 bus 1 1 4 4 12 12 26 26 40 40
39 bus 1 1 4 4 17 18 34 35 51 52
57 bus 1 1 9 10 26 27 53 54 80 81
89 bus 4 5 19 23 78 82 137 141 196 200
118 bus 7 8 35 35 89 89 148 148 208 208
145 bus 1 1 78 81 191 194 304 307 418 421
300 bus 5 5 30 33 145 148 287 290 429 432
Region 1 1 1 2 2 4 7 13 16 23 26
Region 2 1 1 4 4 7 9 12 18 21 27
Region 3 1 1 3 3 5 8 13 17 23 27
Region 4 1 1 3 3 7 9 16 20 25 30
Table 7.3: Quality of Solution Comparison of Integer Linear Program and Heuristic
for Different Data Sets and Varying ρ (Robustness Problem)
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ρ values and running time (in sec)
DataSet 0.1 0.3 0.5 0.7 0.9
ILP Heu ILP Heu ILP Heu ILP Heu ILP Heu
24 bus 0.25 0.01 0.20 0.01 0.19 0.01 0.22 0.01 0.31 0.01
30 bus 0.27 0.01 0.53 0.01 0.47 0.01 0.44 0.01 0.44 0.01
39 bus 0.45 0.01 0.63 0.01 0.90 0.01 0.76 0.01 0.75 0.01
57 bus 2.23 0.02 2.96 0.01 2.40 0.03 2.52 0.02 1.83 0.01
89 bus 12.5 0.12 20.1 0.10 16.0 0.20 13.7 0.13 9.87 0.09
118 bus 19.1 0.19 20.5 0.24 18.6 0.32 19.7 0.37 17.6 0.22
145 bus 81.3 0.17 90.3 0.88 87.8 0.81 86.1 0.65 81.9 0.71
300 bus 272 0.86 271 2.12 264 3.33 234 3.00 235 2.90
Region 1 0.48 0.01 0.65 0.01 0.53 0.01 0.32 0.01 0.36 0.01
Region 2 0.49 0.01 5.04 0.01 8.73 0.01 .38 0.01 0.24 0.01
Region 3 0.46 0.01 2.23 0.01 1.37 0.01 0.29 0.01 0.275 0.01
Region 4 0.50 0.01 4.97 0.01 2.31 0.01 0.47 0.01 0.31 0.01
Region 5 0.61 0.01 2.26 0.01 7.51 0.01 0.31 0.01 0.20 0.01
Table 7.4: Run Time Comparison of Integer Linear Program and Heuristic for
Different Data Sets and Varying ρ (Robustness Problem)
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Chapter 8
THE MIIR MODEL AND K CONTINGENCY LIST PROBLEM
The biggest challenge with the IIM formulation is the identification of the depen-
dency relations between the different entities. This is done based on information
obtained from subject matter experts. However, it has now become clear that this is
not a very reliable procedure. The second problem is that IIM operates on Boolean
logic, implying that the different entities can only have two values — 0 or 1, repre-
senting the state of the entity being operational or non-operational. However, this
does not provide information about entities which are operating at near-failure state.
For example, consider a line that is carrying 95% of its rated capacity. IIM only
provides the state of the line (operational or non-operational). Hence the operator
won’t be alerted even though the line is reaching its peak carrying capacity (which
might eventually cause it to fail). Thus, such scenarios limit the applicability of IIM.
In order to overcome the limitations of IIM and to extend the application domain of
IDRs for long-term planning and short-term operational management, the Multi-scale
Implicative Interdependency Relation (MIIR) model is proposed. The MIIR model
uses the notion of IDRs with added features to capture the power flow in transmis-
sion lines/transformers and demand/generation of buses. Phasor Measurement Unit
(PMU) data can be used to generate the dependency equations as well as obtain-
ing power flow and demand/generation values for actual systems. Using the MIIR
model we study the K contingency list problem in this chapter. At a given time t the
problem solves for a set of K components in the power network which when made
non-operational at time t would cause the maximum number of healthy entities to fail.
Additionally, the solution would provide insights into components which are operat-
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ing at their near capacity limits. Such a solution would have an immediate benefit to
a system operator making decisions in real-time to prevent large-scale power failures.
In this chapter, the MIIR model is developed based on the power network. It is
aimed to have a near accurate abstraction of the power flow dynamics and capture
cascading failure propagation in the same. It is to be noted with proper modifica-
tion the model has the potential to be extended for performing a similar analysis in
different inter/intra-dependent critical infrastructure system(s).
8.1 Model Variables
We consider load buses, generator buses, neutral buses and transmission lines /
transformers as different types of entities. Let E = {e1, e2, . . . , en} denote the set of
entities in the power network. Each entity ei ∈ E has three values associated with it
— (i) a lower bound ei,l, (ii) an upper bound ei,u, and (iii) the instantaneous power
value ei,c,t at time t of the entity. For a transmission line/transformer type entity
ek, the value of ek,c,t provides the power flow in that line at time t. Corresponding,
for a load bus em and generator bus en the values em,c,t and en,c,t provides the load
demand and generating value at time t. For the power transmission system, PMU
data can be used to obtain the instantaneous power value ei,c,t of the entity ei. The
values of ei,l and ei,u can be easily obtained from the entity rating data. For a given
time t the state of the entity is still Boolean (operational or not operational) and is
guided by the following two factors — (a) ei,c,t satisfies the property ei,l < ei,c,t < ei,u,
(b) the corresponding dependency equation of ei at time t is satisfied. Hence, if ei
has an IDR ei ← ej · ek + el then for ei to be operational both the properties —
(a) (ei and ek) or el is operational at t − δ, and (b) ei,t ≤ ei,c,t ≤ ei,u has to be
satisfied. Here δ refers to the time within which the effect of failure of an entity is
propagated to its dependent entity. So using MIIR model the power network at time
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t is mathematically represented as P (E,B,Ct, F ) where E is the set of of entities, B
is a set of tuples {ei,l, ei,u} (∀ei ∈ E) denoting the power value bound on the entity,
Ct consist of instantaneous power value ei,c,t (∀ei ∈ E) at time t and F contains the
set of dependency equations for the entities in E. A similar notation has been used
in [33] but our notation brings out a completely different topological aspect of the
power network.
8.2 Generating and Obtaining the Model Variables for a Power Network
We illustrate our strategy to generate the dependency equations F and the set Ct
of a power network P (E,B,Ct, F ) at a given time t. The MATPOWER [31] software
is used to generate the simulated data. For a given time t and a standard bus system
(containing a set of buses and transmission lines/transformers E), the software uses
load demand of the bus, the impedance of the transmission lines/transformers, etc. to
solve the power flow. The software produces the voltage of each bus in the system as
the output. The software suite also includes a wide range of test systems along with
power ratings of the components for all such systems. We restrict ourselves to analyze
the real power flow. Firstly, for a given solution, we formally state the procedure to
obtain the tuple values of the set B and instantaneous power value contained in the set
C for generator buses, load buses, neutral buses and transmission lines/transformers
—
• Generator Bus: The real part of the power generated is taken as the value
of ea,c,t for a generator bus ea ∈ E. The upper bound ea,u is set to its real
generation capacity (supplied in the MATPOWER suite) and the lower bound
ea,l is set to 0. It is to be noted that some generator buses have load demand.
Consider ex be a generator bus with load demand d units and real instantaneous
power generated ex,c,t units. Without any loss of generality, such a bus is split
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into a generator bus ex1 with 0 load demand (instantaneous power generated
ex1,c,t) and a load bus ex2 with instantaneous load demand d units (instantaneous
power generated 0). A transmission line ex12 is constructed that connects ex1
to ex2 with an instantaneous power flow of d units flowing from ex1 to ex2.
• Load Bus: The real part of the load demand is taken as instantaneous demand
value eb,c,t of a load bus eb ∈ E. For a load bus eb, both its upper and lower
bound is set to the instantaneous demand value eb,c,t. Essentially, our assump-
tion is that a load bus does not change its demand value irrespective of any
failure.
• Neutral Bus: For a neutral bus ed ∈ E the values of ed,l, ed,u and ed,c,t are set
to 0.
• Transmission Lines/Transformers: For two buses e1 and e2 connected by a
transmission line/transformer e12 the power flowing through the transmission
line/transformer is calculated as P12 = Real(V1 ∗ (V1−V2I12 )∗), where V1 is the
voltage at bus e1, V2 is the voltage at bus e2 (V1 and V2 returned by the MAT-
POWER solver) and I12 is the impedance of the transmission line/transformer
e12 (obtained from the supplied bus system file of MATPOWER). P12 is the real
component of the power flowing in the transmission line/transformer e12. The
lower bound is set to 0 and the upper bound is taken as the rated capacity of
the transmission line/transformer. The instantaneous power value e12,c,t is set
to |P12| (absolute value).
The description of this system indicates that power flows from bus e1 to e2 if P12
is positive and vice-versa otherwise. As a result, we can interpret the direction of
power flow in the line from the solution which we obtained from MATPOWER. We
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use this solution to generate the set F which is the set of dependency equations. As
an example, we consider the nine bus system which is shown in Figure 3.4 (refer to
Chapter 3). This figure describes a power network P (E,B,Ct, F ), at time instance t
with E being the set of entities containing generator buses from G1 to G3, load buses
L1 to L4, neutral buses {N1, N2} and transmission lines/transformers T1 through
T9. The figure also provides the instantaneous power values by solving the power
network flow based on demand/generation at some time instant t. The red blocks
denote the instantaneous real power generated by a generator, the green blocks denote
instantaneous real load demands and the blue nodes are neutral. The values in the
grey blocks denote the flow of power in the transmission lines/transformers with the
arrows denoting the direction of the power flow. There aren’t any IDRs for the
transmission lines. Consider a bus b1 connected to buses b2, b3 through transmission
lines/transformers b12 (between b1 and b2) and b13 between (b1 and b3). Also, let
power flow from buses b2, b3 to bus b1. The dependency equation for the bus b1
is constructed as disjunction of minterms of size 2 (this consists of the bus from
which the power is flowing and the respective transmission line/transformer) with
each disjunction corresponding to buses from which power is flowing to it. For this
example the dependency equation b1 ← b12b2 + b13b3 is created. Using this definition,
the dependency equations for the buses in Figure 3.4 are as follows — (a) L1 ← T1 ·G1
, (b) L2 ← T2 ·L1 + T7 ·N2, (c) L3 ← T3 ·L1 + T4 ·N1, (d) L4 ← T6 ·N1 + T8 ·N2, (e)
N1 ← T5 ·G3, (f) N2 ← T9 ·G2.
8.3 Dynamics of the MIIR model
To understand the dynamics of cascading failure in power network based on the
MIIR model we first create the abstract representation P (E,B,C0, F ) (which is con-
structed using the technique discussed in Section 8.2) for a power network at time
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t = 0. An event of initial failure is assumed to occur at time t = 0 with failure cascade
propagating in unit time steps. For an entity that is operational at time step t = τ
the following equations are required to be satisfied —∑
em∈Oeg
em,c,τ =
∑
en∈Ieg
en,c,τ + eg,c,τ ,∀eg ∈ G (8.1)
∑
em∈Oel
em,c,τ =
∑
en∈Iel
en,c,τ − el,c,τ ,∀el ∈ L (8.2)
∑
em∈Oek
em,c,τ =
∑
en∈Iek
en,c,τ + ek,c,τ ,∀ek ∈ N (8.3)
Equations (8.1)-(8.3) dictate the law of conservation of energy for each bus in the
system. That is, we assume that the power flowing out from a bus is equal to the
power flowing into it for a unit time step.
In (8.1), the lines through which power flows out and into the generator bus eg
(where G ⊂ E contains all generator buses) are represented by sets Ieg and Oeg
respectively. Equations (8.2) and (8.3) uses the same notations for load bus el (where
L ⊂ E contains all load buses) and neutral bus ek (where N ⊂ E contains all neutral
buses), respectively. In (8.3), the value of ek,c,t = 0 for all time steps and hence it can
be simplified as
∑
em∈Oek em,c,t =
∑
en∈Iek en,c,t. Additionally, for a generator bus there
is no power injected to it. Hence 8.1 can be re-written as
∑
em∈Ieg em,c,t = eg,c,t,∀eg ∈
G. We use this abstract representation of the power network i.e. P (E,B,C0, F ) at
time t = 0. Using this the cascading failure process of the power network on an event
of initial failure of E ′ ⊂ E at time step t = 0 is detailed out in Algorithm 9.
In Algorithm 9, at every iteration the flow values are adjusted based on Equations
8.1-8.3 at line 8 and entities are made non-operational based on the two conditions
mentioned at lines 7 and 9. The cascading process continues if new entities fail in
the previous time step (condition size 6= |S|). As evident we assume that there is a
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Algorithm 9: Algorithm describing the failure cascading process in power net-
work using MIIR model
Data: A power network P (E,B,C0, F ) at time t = 0 and a set of initially failing
entities E′ ⊂ E
Result: A set of failed entities S
1 begin
2 Initialize S ← E′, size← 0 ;
3 Increment t← t+ 1 ;
4 while size 6= |S| do
5 Set size← |S|;
6 Remove all entities whose dependency equations are not satisfied and add
them to set S;
7 Adjust power flow values ek,c,t of transmission line/transformer entities ek
and generating values eg,c,t of generator buses eg such that Equations 8.1
-8.3 are satisfied.;
8 Remove all entities whose bounds are not satisfied and add them to set S ;
9 Increment t← t+ 1 ;
10 return S ;
unit time delay for an entity to become non operational if its dependency equations
are unsatisfied. All entities whose bound values are not satisfied are made non-
operational at that time step after power flow calculation. It is to be noted that the
dependency equations are generated from a graph which is directed acyclic. Owing to
this property the cascade reaches a steady state (no new entities are non-operational)
within O(|E|) time steps. This can be explained as follows. Consider a single initial
failure of an entity. If no entity fails the cascading algorithm would continue till at
most |E|− 1 time steps since the maximum distance between two nodes in a directed
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acyclic graph is |E| − 1 (considering each edge having a weight 1). If more than one
entity fails then the cascade is expected to stop before |E| − 1. Hence the number of
cascading time steps is strictly upper bounded by |E| − 1.
Algorithm 9 assumes that there exist a method to compute the flow value equa-
tions to get the instantaneous power values of the entities. This is equivalent to
computing the AC power flow equations again (using MATPOWER) which would
be time intensive and does not make use of the abstraction created by the MIIR
model for fast decision-making. Moreover, using general graph theoretical algorith-
mic techniques might result in multiple solutions of instantaneous power values when
solving a given set of power flow equations thus resulting in ambiguity. To counteract
this, in our abstraction, we use the notion of Worst-Case Cascade Propagation
(WCCP) in Algorithm 9. Qualitatively, the instantaneous value of power flows and
power generator at every time step t > 0 of the cascade is set to a value that would
cause the maximum number of entities to fail at the end of the cascade. Computation
of this power flow values using WCCP is proved to be NP-complete in Section 8.5.
We devise a mixed integer program to get the optimal solution and a greedy heuristic
to get a sub-optimal solution in polynomial time in Section 6.2.
8.4 Case Study: The 2011 Southwest Blackout
In this subsection the performance of MIIR with WCCP is tested on a real power
system event: the 2011 Southwest Blackout. All data used in this analysis are ob-
tained from [2]. An abstraction of the Southwest Power System is provided in Figure
8.1. The abbreviations used in Figure 8.1 are — Western Electricity Coordinating
Council (WECC), Serrano (SE), Devers (DE), San Onofre Nuclear Generating Sta-
tion (SONGS), San Diego Gas & Electric (SDG&E), Miguel (MI), Imperial Valley
(IV), Imperial Irrigation District (IID), Comision Federal de Electricidad’s (CFE, cor-
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responding to Baja California Control Area), North Gila (NG), Hassayampa (HA),
Palo Verde (PV), and Western Area Power Administration-Lower Colorado (WAPA).
The blue, orange and green blocks in Figure 8.1 represents neutral, load and generator
buses respectively. The transmission lines/transformers are labeled T1−T17 with the
arrows indicating the directions of the pre-disturbance power flows. On September 8,
2011, an initial trip of the HA-NG transmission line (T11) caused blackout in SDG
& E region. The objective here is to verify whether MIIR model with WCCP is able
to capture the power outage.
WECC
PVDESE
SONGS
SDG	&	E
IID
IVMI
HA
NG		
CFE
T10
T11
T3T4
T2
T5
T6
T7
T12 T13
T8
T9
Figure 8.1: An Abstraction of the Southwest Power System.
The dependency equations in Table 8.1 without the bounds and instantaneous
power values of the entities (buses and transmission lines) corresponds to the set F .
Consider tripping of the entity T11 at t = 0. Just considering the IDRs itself, the
component NG fails at t = 1, WALC and IV at t = 2, CFE and MI at t = 3. The
pre-disturbance load demands of SDG&E and IID were approximately 5000 MW and
900 MW, respectively, while the generation bounds on PV and WECC were [0, 4000
MW] and [0, 10000 MW], respectively. After failure of T11, SDG&E and IID would
try to meet their bulk load demands through the generator buses PV and WECC via
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Dependency Equations
SE ← T1 ·WECC + T4 ·DE
DE ← T3 · PV + T2 ·WECC
SONGS ← T5 · SE
SDG&E ← T6 · SONGS + T7 ·MI
IID ← T8 ·DE + T15 ·WALC + T9 · IV
MI ← T12 · IV
IV ← T13 ·NG
CFE ← T14 · IV + T13 ·MI
WALC ← T16 ·NG
NG← T11 ·HA
HA← T10 · PV
Table 8.1: IDRs of the Southwest Power System
T6 and T8. The bound on T6 is [0, 2200 MW] and T8 is [0, 1800 MW]. Both PV and
WECC have enough generation capacity to meet the load demand of SDG&E and
IID. At t = 3 owing to the load demand of SDG&E the transmission line T6 would
have try to have a power flow of 5000 MW instantly. Thus T6 would trip at t = 3
causing SDG&E to trip at t = 4. Owing to this the power flowing through T1, T4
and T5 would reduce down to 0 at t = 4. The power flow in T8 would increase to 900
MW at t = 3 for supplying power to IID. Thus the steady state is reached at t = 4
and MIIR model accurately predicts the blackout of SDG&E region.
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8.5 K Contingency List — Problem Formulation
It is important from a power system operator’s point of view to understand and
know the most critical entities in the network at a given time. This would enable
the operator to make more reliable decisions when unforeseen events/failures occur.
For larger systems, an automation that provides the operator with this information
would be highly beneficial. Owing to this we develop the K Contingency List (KCoL)
problem using MIIR model with WCCP. For a given time t and an integer K the prob-
lem provides the operator with a list of K entities which when failed initially causes
the maximum number of entities to fail at the steady state of cascade propagation.
Qualitatively, for a given integer K the problem finds a set E ′ (|E ′| = K) entities
which when failed initially maximizes the total number of entities failed at the end of
the cascading process. A formal description of the KCoL problem using WCCP with
MIIR model for the Power Network is provided —
Input: (a) A power network P (E,B,Ct, F ) where E = G ∪ L ∪ N ∪ T . Set of
entities G, L, N and T are disjoint and contains the generator buses, load buses, neu-
tral buses and transmission lines/transformers, respectively. (b) two positive integers
K and S.
Decision Version: Does there exist a set of K entities in E whose failure at time
t would result in a failure of at least S entities in total at the end of the cascading
process?
Optimization Version: Compute the a set of K entities in a power network
P (E,B,Ct, F ) whose failure at time t would maximize the number of entities failed
at the steady state of cascade propagation.
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We prove the problem is NP-complete to solve in Theorem 16
Theorem 16. The KCoL problem using MIIRA model is NP-complete.
Proof. The problem is proved to NP-complete by a reduction from the densest p−sub-
hypergraph problem [32]. An instance of the densest p−subhypergraph problem con-
sists of a hypergraph H = (V,E) and two parameters p and M . The decision version
of the problem finds the answer to whether there exists a set of vertices V ′ ⊂ V and
|V ′| ≤ p which completely covers at least M hyper-edges.
From an instance of the densest p−subhypergraph we create an instance of the
KCoL problem as follows. We start with an empty set of entities G, L and T and an
empty set F that would comprise of the dependency equations. A load type entity
Lj is added to set L for each hyper-edge Ej ∈ E with instantaneous load demand
Li,c,t set to the number of vertices that comprise this hyper-edge. For each vertex
Vi ∈ V we add a generator type entity Gi to set G. The upper bound on the capacity
of the generator Gi is set to the sum of all instantaneous load demands Li,c,t + 1 for
which the corresponding hyper-edge Ej contains the vertex Vi. For each hyper-edge
Ej consisting of vertices Vx, Vy, Vz (say) three transmission line type entities Tx, Ty
and Tz are added to set T and a dependency equation Lj ← Tx ·Gx +Ty ·Gy +Tz ·Gz
is created and added to set F . The upper bound of the transmission line is set to
the load demand +1 of the entity it connects to (e.g., in this case, the maximum
capacity of each transmission line Tx, Ty, Tz are set to the instantaneous load demand
Li,c,t + 1). The parameter S of KCoL problem is set to p+M and K is set to p (i.e.
p entities fail at time t). Thus the created instance satisfy the property of the graph
from which the dependency relations are computed being Directed Acyclic. In the
initial operating condition at time t, all transmission lines have a line flow value of
1 unit with each generator Gi producing Pi units of power, where Pi is the number
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of load entities it is connected to. Hence all load demands are satisfied. It can be
directly followed that an instance of KCoL problem can be created from an instance
of densest p−subhypergraph problem in polynomial time.
It is to be noted that for the created instance — (1) Each transmission line has the
capacity to satisfy the complete load demand of the load type entity it is connecting,
(ii) Each generator has the capacity to satisfy the load demand of all the load type
entities it is connected to. Hence an initial failure of one or more entities would
not cause any transmission line or generator to trip (fail) because of exceeding its
maximum capacity. Thus the generators and transmission lines are susceptible only
to initial failure whereas the load entities are vulnerable to both initial and induced
failures. However, failure of load entities can not cause any induced failure. Induced
failure of the load entity can be caused only when each minterm in its dependency
equation have at least one failed entity. Thus no entity fail due to change in power
flow values.
Now consider there exist a solution to the densest p−subhypergraph problem.
Hence there exist a set of p vertices V ′ that completely covers M hyper-edges. Failing
the generator type entities corresponding to the vertices in V ′ would thus fail at least
M load entities at t+1 according to the instance construction. Thus a total of at least
p + M entities would fail which solves the KCoL problem. On the other way round
consider there exist a solution to the KCoL problem. As reasoned earlier, a load
entity cannot cause any induced failure. Hence if a load entity is in the solution then
it can be substituted with any operational generator entity without loss of correctness.
Similarly, if a transmission line type entity is in the solution it can be replaced by
a generator type entity it is connected to. Using this substitution a solution thus
comprises of entities G′ ⊂ G. All M (or greater than M) entities that fail due to the
initial failure of p entities belongs to set L. Thus the substituted solution (or original
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solution if no substitution is required) would consist of generator type entities that
cause failure of these M (or greater than M) load entities. Hence selecting the vertices
corresponding to G′ would ensure that at least M hyper-edges are completely covered
solving the densest p−subhypergraph problem. Hence proved.
8.6 Solutions to the Problem
Owing to the KCoL problem being NP-complete, we obtain the optimal solution
using Mixed Integer Program (MIP). However, as we require to compute the contin-
gency list fast, we also devise a polynomial time heuristic that provides a sub-optimal
solution to the problem.
8.6.1 Optimal Solution using Mixed Integer Program (MIP)
As a reference frame, we consider that the initial failure occurs at time step t = 0.
It is shown in Section 8.3 that the number of time steps in the cascade is upper
bounded by |E| − 1. We devise an MIP that solves the KCoL problem optimally for
a power network P (E,B,C0, F ) (the abstraction constructed for t = 0). Irrespective
of whether the steady state is reached before or at time step |E| − 1, in our MIP we
try to maximize the number of entities failed at t = |E| − 1 when K entities fail at
t = 0. Moreover, it can not be predicted when the cascading failure stops. Hence, the
MIP is bound to check for solution to compute the maximum number of entities that
can fail till the maximum possible time step, i.e. |E| − 1. Firstly, the list of variables
used in the MIP formulation are discussed—
• Variable List 1: For each entity ei ∈ E a variable set xi,t,∀t, 0 ≤ t ≤ |E| − 1
are created. The value of xi,t is 0 if the entity is operational at time step t and
1 otherwise.
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• Variable List 2: For each entity ei ∈ E a variable set yi,t,∀t, 0 ≤ t ≤ |E| − 1 is
created. From the set C0 we can get the initial instantaneous power value ei,c,0
of an entity ei. The value of yi,0 is set to ei,c,0. All the instantaneous values are
real thus comprising the set of non integer variables in the program.
Using these definitions and the list of variables created, the objective of the MIP
is provided in (8.4) and the constraints of the MIP are formally described.
max
|E|∑
i=1
xi,|E|−1 (8.4)
Subjected to:
Constraint Set 1:
∑|E|
i=1 xi,0 = K. This constraint sets the number of entities failed
at time step t = 0 to K.
Constraint Set 2: xi,d ≥ xi,t−1,∀t, 1 ≤ t ≤ |E| − 1. This ensures that an entity that
is not operational at time step t = d would remain non-operational in all times step
t > d.
Constraint Set 3: Consider an IDR of form ei ← ea · eb + ec · ed. To capture the
cascading failure process, a set of constraints is developed and described below —
Step 1: New variables are introduced to represent the minterms. In this example,
two new variables cab and ccd are created to represent the terms ea · eb and ec · ed.
This is equivalent of adding two new IDRs cab ← ea · eb and ccd ← ec · ed with the
transformed IDR being ei ← cab + ccd.
Step 2: A linear constraint is developed for the c type variables to capture the failure
propagation. For an IDR cab ← ea · eb, the constraint is represented as cab,t ≤
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xa,t−1 + xb,t−1, ∀t, 1 ≤ t ≤ |E| − 1. This captures the condition that cab,t is equal to 1
only if at least one of the entities ea or eb is non operational.
Step 3: For each transformed IDR a linear constraint is introduced. For an IDR ei ←
cab+ ccd the constraint is represented as N ×xi,t ≤ cab,t−1 + ccd,t−1,∀t, 1 ≤ t ≤ |E|−1.
Here N is the number of minterms in the IDR (in this example N = 2).
Constraint Set 4: For a given load bus entity el, the constraint yl,t = 0,∀t, 0 ≤ t ≤
|E| − 1 is added denoting that the instantaneous power demand of all the load bus
remain constant at each time step. Similarly, for a given neutral bus entity en, the
constraint yn,t = 0,∀t, 0 ≤ t ≤ |E| − 1 is added.
Constraint Set 5: For a given generator bus entity ep and transmission line entity eq,
the constraints xp,t ≤ yp,tep,u ,∀t, 1 ≤ t ≤ |E| − 1 and xq,t ≤
yq,t
eq,u
, ∀t, 1 ≤ t ≤ |E| − 1 are
added. As this is a maximization problem, the x type variable of the corresponding
generator/transmission line entity would be set to 1 when it operates beyond its rated
upper bound. The constraints ya,t ≥ 0 and ya,t ≤ ea,u + 1 are added at all time steps
for each generator or transmission line type entity ea. This limits the maximum value
of these entities to its upper bound plus one and them failing only if their instanta-
neous power value is just above the upper bound.
Constraint Set 6: To capture the power flow equations given by (8.1)-(8.3) the follow-
ing constraints are developed. Consider the equation
∑
em∈Oel em,c,t =
∑
en∈Iel en,c,t−
el,c,t. Naively, this can be constructed as a non-linear constraint
∑
em∈Oel (1− xm,t)×
ym,t =
∑
en∈Iel (1−xn,t)×yn,t−(1−xl,t)yl,t+1. The constraint denotes that the instanta-
neous flow values of the different power network entities are taken into consideration if
the the load bus is operational at the next time step (as failure due to IDR is reflected
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after 1 unit of time). This constraint can be linearized as
∑
em∈Oel (ym,t−xm,t×em,u) =∑
en∈Iel (yn,t−xn,t×en,u)− (yl,t−xl,t+1el,u). If a transmission line/transformer en fails
at time instant t then its instantaneous power value is set to its upper bound (owing
to constraint set 5). This would equate the term (yn,t − xn,t × en,u) corresponding to
this transmission line/transformer to 0. If the transmission line/transformer en is op-
erational then xn,t = 0 and hence (yn,t−xn,t× en,u) would equate to yn,t−1 thus being
considered in the power flow equation. Similarly if the load bus is not operational the
value of (yl,t−xl,t+1el,u) is set to 0. These constraints are constructed for all time steps
0 ≤ t ≤ |E|−2 and similar constraints are generated for equations 8.1 and 8.3 as well.
Constraint Set 7: For each transmission line/transformer type entity ea ∈ E flowing
out power from a bus type entity eb the constraint xa,t ≤ xb,t is added for each time
step 1 ≤ t ≤ |E| − 1. This captures the condition that if a bus type entity fails then
all transmission lines/transformers to which it transmits power also fails.
It is to be noted that there won’t be any infeasibility in solution arising due to the
constraints. The load and neutral buses can only be made non-operational through
their dependency equations. Whereas, the transmission lines/transformers and gen-
erators can be only made non-operational through change in power flow/generation
values (as they don’t have any dependency equations). The objective in (8.4) along
with these set of constraints, finds the the set of K entities whose initial failure at
t = 0 maximizes the number of entities failed at the end of the cascading process. As
this is a maximization problem the power flow and generation at each time step is
set to values that maximize the total number of entities failing at the steady state.
Hence the MIP captures the notion of WCCP.
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8.6.2 Heuristic Solution
In this section we design a sub-optimal heuristic that finds a solution to the KCoL
problem in polynomial time. Primarily we use the definition of Kill Set defined in
section 4.1 and Fractional Minterm Hit Value defined below.
Definition: Fractional Minterm Hit Value: For an entity ej ∈ E in an power network
P (E,B,Ct, F ) the Fractional Minterm Hit Value is denoted as FMHV (ej). It is
calculated as FMHV (ej) =
∑m
i=1
ci
|si| where m are the minterms and for a given
minterm mi, ci are the number of entities that belong to KS(ej) and |si| is its size.
This metric provides an estimate of impact of other operational entities that can be
made non-operational at future time steps if the entity ej is made non-operational.
Algorithm 10 returns a sub-optimal value of E ′ which when failed initially would
greedily maximize (based on Kill Set and FMHV ) the number of entities failed at the
end of the cascade. The algorithm runs in O(Kn(n+m)2) where n = |E| and m are
the total number of minterms. It is to be noted that the greedy failure maximization
is done based on IDR. To get the actual number of entities failed when the set of
entities E ′ fail initially we use the MIP. Essentially, we modify the constraint 1 such
that only entities in E ′ fail at t = 0 and see the number of entities failed at the final
time step. This gives us a measure to compare the efficacy of the heuristic solution
with respect to the MIP.
8.7 Experimental Results
We analyzed the run time performance and quality of the heuristic solution with
respect to MIP for different test systems. The quality of the solution is defined by the
number of components reported to be non-operational for a given value of K. Specifi-
cally we used the 9, 14, 24, 30, 39, 57, 118, 145, 300 and 2383 Winter Polish bus systems
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Algorithm 10: Heuristic Solution to KoCL problem
Data: A power network P (E,B,C0, F ) at time t = 0 and an integer K.
Result: A set of initially failing entities E′ ⊂ E and |E′| ≤ K
1 begin
2 Initialize D ← ∅ E′ ← ∅ and KH ← 0;
3 while KH < K do
4 Update KH ← KH + 1;
5 For each entity ei ∈ E\D compute the kill set Cei ;
6 For each entity ei ∈ E\D compute FMHV (ei);
7 Let ej be the entity having highest |Cej | ;
8 if There exists multiple entities having highest cardinality Kill Set then
9 Let ep be an entity having highest FMHV (ep) with ep in the set of
entities having highest cardinality Kill Set;
10 If there is a tie choose arbitrarily;
11 Update E′ ← E′ ∪ {ep}, D ← D ∪ Cep ;
12 Update all dependencies in F by removing entities in the left and right
side of the IDRs that belong to Cep ;
13 else
14 Update E′ ← E′ ∪ {ej}, D ← D ∪ Cxj ;
15 Update all dependencies in F by removing entities in the left and right
side of the IDRs that belong to Cep ;
16 return E′ ;
available in MATPOWER. For a given test system, we used the MATPOWER AC
power solver. Using the data, the abstract power network P (E,B,C0, F ) was gen-
erated. On the constructed power network the MIP and heuristic solutions were
executed. The implementation was done in Java and a student licensed version of
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IBM CPLEX optimizer was used to solve the MIP. A UNIX system with 8 GB of
RAM and intel i5 processor was used for the execution.
In Table 8.2, a comparison between the MIP and the heuristic solution with respect
to the number of entities in non-operational state for different bus systems with K
varied from 1 to 5 in steps of 1 are provided. Additionally, the total number of
entities (buses and transmission lines) for each bus system is mentioned. It is to be
noted that the total number of entities and the number of entities in non-operational
state include the entities constructed for generator buses with non-zero load demand
(as mentioned in Section 8.2). Table 8.3 reports the IDR generation time for each
bus system along with the time taken to execute the MIP and heuristic for different
values of K. Some insightful observations from the results are as follows — (a) The
heuristic solution performs very nearly to that of MIP with respect to quality and have
an almost same performance for K = 1. (b) For almost all the cases, the maximum
percent difference in the number of non-operational entities in heuristic with respect
to MIP is under 1% with a maximum percent difference of 7% for 57 bus system
at K = 3. (c) It is observed that more than 50% of the total entities in a given
test system will be non-operational if K = 1. This implies that the power system is
extremely vulnerable even if a single entity is attacked, (d) For almost all the test
systems from 9 to 300 the heuristic finds a solution to the KCol problem nearly 100
times faster than the MIP, (e) for the 2383 Winter Polish bus system the heuristic is
10 to 20 times faster. However, it is be noted that the comparison is done based on a
serialized implementation of the heuristic and can be made faster by parallelization.
Hence, it can be reasonably argued that the Heuristic solves the KCol problem
achieving near optimal solution at a much faster time compared to MIP. Thus the
abstraction provided by the MIIR model along with the Heuristic solution can be
used by a Power Network operator to obtain the K Contingency List in real-time.
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Chapter 9
CONCLUSION AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS
In concluding remarks this dissertation attempts to perform an in depth study on un-
derstanding inter/intra dependent critical infrastructure systems and analyzing their
vulnerability along with approaches to protect them from such vulnerabilities. The
limitations of the existing models in capturing the dependencies in critical infras-
tructure system is brought upon through a survey. For addressing these limitations
the Implicative Interdependency Model is introduced. Different problems addressing
vulnerability and protection analysis are proposed and solved using the IIM model.
Owing to certain limitations of the IIM model, the MIIR model is proposed to coun-
teract them. Using the MIIR model the K contingency list problem is formulated and
solved that addresses vulnerabilities in power network. All the problems discussed in
this dissertation are NP-complete. The polynomial time solutions derived for these
problems are seen to be efficient in terms of quality and time performance when com-
pared to Integer Linear programs (Mixed Integer program for the K contingency list
problem) used to find the optimal solution.
This dissertation is a basis for a multitude of future research problems. Apart
from this being a documentation, all source code and test data sets are made open
source to support any future research. The online repository containing source codes
to the solutions of the problems can be found in https://github.com/jbanerje1989.
Some of the future research directions are discussed —
• Some other problems that can be solved: The IIM/MIIR model can be used to
address some other pertinent problems in critical infrastructure system. The
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following can be of interest as future research problems — (a) Analysis with in-
complete/incorrect information: Inaccurate/Incomplete dependency equations
or other model parameters directly impact solutions of different problems. Such
inaccuracies can arise due to many reasons such as incorrect data or approxi-
mations done due to unavailability of data. Thus studying the impact on the
solutions of different problems under such inaccuracies is a possible research
problem, (b) Islanding in Multi-Layer Networks: The concept of islanding is
well studied in power network. Using the IIM model or the MIIR model this
can be extended to multi-layer interdependent power communication network.
The main task to address such a problem is to have a concrete and realistic
definition of islanding in multi-layered network under the model setting.
• Extending solutions to the problems using MIIR model: The problems that are
solved using the IIM model (i.e. Entity Hardening Problem, Targeted Hard-
ening Problem, Auxiliary Entity Allocation Problem, Robustness Computation
problem) can be extended and solved using the MIIR model.
• Extending MIIR model to have an abstraction of interdependent systems: The
model is developed based on intra-dependencies in power network. It can be ex-
tended to have an accurate abstraction of interdependent power-communication
network. Such an extension might require some changes in the model parame-
ters and dynamics.
• Building a toolkit and a GUI: The ultimate research goal is to build a graphical
user interface which a system operator can use to analyze vulnerability and make
appropriate control actions to reduce failure in intra/inter dependent systems.
A suite can be developed for different real world test beds that displays fast
solutions to different problems using the MIIR model.
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